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GETTING MORE THAN JUSTICE ON PAPER:
BANKRUPTCY PRIORITIES AND THE CRISIS OF
UNPAID WAGES
Omer Kimhi*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Donald Sloat, a fifty-nine-year-old man from Maryland, worked for
twenty-two years for Hill Enterprises-a cabinetmaker.' Devoted to his
job, Mr. Sloat "work[ed] his way up from a carpenter to a project
engineer," until he resigned in 2010.2 Prior to his resignation, his
employers often asked him to wait on cashing his paychecks or
neglected to pay him at all; and so, at the time he left Hill Enterprises,
the company owed him $17,000 in unpaid wages.3 Unfortunately, Mr.
Sloat was unable to recover the money.4 Shortly after his resignation, the
company filed for bankruptcy, and holding almost no assets, it could not
pay its creditors.5 Although Mr. Sloat's wage claims were completely
justified, he never received the money he had worked for and, as a result,
underwent financial difficulties himself.6
What is troubling is tha. Donald Sloat is not alone. All over the
country, employers fail to pay employees their legal rights (wages,
pensions, or other benefits), and employees often lose weeks' or even
* Associate Professor, Haifa University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Douglas
Baird, Eyal Zamir, Alon Harel, Ronen Perry, Hadar Jabotinsky, and Vincy Fon for their comments
on earlier drafts of this Article. The author also thanks Nataly Damary for excellent research
assistance.
1. Yvonne Wenger, 'Wage Theft'Prevailsin Post-Recession Economy, BALT. SUN (Feb. 2
2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-02-02/news/bs-md-wage-theft-20130202_ 1wagetheft-wage-and-labor-catherine-ruckelshaus.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. According to the Baltimore Sun, Sloat had to ask his elderly parents for financial
assistance and was unable to pay college tuition for his twenty-two-year-old daughter, who was
working as a waitress. Id.
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months' worth of wages.7 The wage theft often occurs because
employees are reluctant to file a claim against their employer. However,
in many cases, even when an employee does file a claim (and even after
she receives a judgment in her favor),8 she still isn't paid.9 The judgment
cannot be enforced, and the employee is left with a winning claim, but
with no possibility to collect.1" This Article discusses this subset of
cases-those in which the employee filed a claim against her employer
(either within or outside of bankruptcy), her claim was declared justified,
but the judgment remained on paper and uncollected.1 1 The reason for
the failure to collect being the employer declared bankruptcy or
otherwise avoided payment.12
The data regarding uncollected wage claims, although largely
undiscussed, is staggering. According to a study conducted by Eunice
Hyunhye Cho, Tia Koonse, and Anthony Mischel, only seventeen
percent of Californian workers who prevailed in their wage claims
between 2008 and 2011 were able to recover any payment from their
employer.13 In that same time frame, the Department of Labor Standards
Enforcement in California ("DLSE") issued awards for unpaid wages of
more than $282 million, but workers were only able to collect a mere
$42 million of those awards.1 4 In Oregon, the situation is only slightly
better. According to the Oregon Center for Public Policy, in a recent
three-year period, almost three quarters of the monetary findings against
employers were not recovered, and the employees were left unpaid for
their services.15 Texas, New York, Florida, and North Carolina do not
publish exact numbers, but reports from practitioners indicate that the
7. See NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH
ON WAGE AND HOUR VIOLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2013), http://www.nelp.org/contentI
uploads/2015/03/WinningWageJusticeSummaryofResearchonWageTheft.pdf.
8. I use the term judgment in a broad sense to include any formal legal decision or decree
stating that an employee's claim for payment is legally justified. The judgment can be given by a
court of law, by an administrative agency, or by a bankruptcy trustee. Pursuant to §§ 704(a)(5) and
1102 of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee should examine proofs of claims and object to the
allowance of any claim that is improper. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(5), 1102 (2012). For our purposes, a
decision by the bankruptcy trustee not to object to an employment claim filed as part of the
bankruptcy process is also considered a judgment.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 48-67.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 48-67.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 48-67.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 48-67.
13. EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO ET AL., NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT & UCLA LABOR CTR., THE
(2013),
WAGES FOR CALIFORNIA'S WORKERS 2
CRISIS IN COLLECTING UNPAID

http://nelp.3cdn.net/f6fc363a30266fcd3_pzm6id Ixa.pdf. The data does not include settlements. Id.
14. Id.
15.

OR. CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, EMPLOYERS PAY ONLY A FRACTION OF MONETARY

FINDINGS IN WAGE THEFT CASES 1 (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.ocpp.org/media/uploads/
pdf/2015/02/fs20150021 1WageTheftRecovery_fnl_.pdf.
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situation is much the same. Evidence from these states shows that
employees with winning judgments in their hands often are not paid
because employers file for bankruptcy, hide assets, or simply
disappear. 6 One can assume employees in other states do not
fare much better.
This phenomenon occurs despite the fact that, at least when the
employer is in bankruptcy, current law provides employees with
preferential treatment when compared to regular unsecured creditors.
Sections 507(a)(4) and (5) of the Bankruptcy Code give wage claims
priority over other unsecured claims, so that employees who hold wage
claims of up to $12,475 are paid before other unsecured creditors. 17
Congress has continuously increased the amount and the scope of the
preference; in 2013, there was even a proposed amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code to increase the amount to $20,000.1 Much of the legal
literature supports this trend. Scholars explain that employees are
maladjusting creditors, and that the Bankruptcy Code should reflect a
concern for the employees by giving them a prioritized claim.' 9
Contrary to this approach, this Article argues that the bankruptcy
wage priority is a poor solution for the plight of the American
employee.2" The priority not only does not adequately protect the
employees, but it is also economically inefficient.2' Instead of the
bankruptcy priority, this Article suggests implementing an insurancebased solution.2 2 According to the proposal, all employees and
employers will pay a fee to a wage assurance fund established by the
state, and the fund shall pay unpaid employees (with favorable
judgments) if their employers are bankrupt or otherwise avoid
payment.23 The fund will be able to collect the payment it made from the
employer (in lieu of the employee collecting herself), but its status will
be that of a regular unsecured creditor rather than a priority creditor.24
The insurance-based model, which is implemented by the majority of
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")
16. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)-(5) (2012). The limit of $10,000 found in § 507(a)(4)(5) has been
increased to the current amount of $12,475, pursuant to instructions from Congress. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 104 (2012); Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code Prescribed Under
Section 104(a) of the Code, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,089, 12,090 (Feb. 21, 2013).
18. Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2013, H.R. 100,
113th Cong. § 101(1)(A) (2013).
19. See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part l.B.
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. See infra Part 111.
23. See infra Part LI.B.
24. See infra Part III.C.
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countries, insures that employees who prevailed in their claims will
indeed receive their wages, but in return, it demands that the public pays
a fee (a premium)."
This Article supports the adoption of this insurance-based model
over the current bankruptcy priority model with four different
justifications.26 The first justification relates to the fact that the
bankruptcy priority, by definition, applies only when an employer files
for bankruptcy.27 An employee whose employer decides not to file
receives no preferential treatment and is forced to conduct collection
efforts as a regular unsecured creditor.2" This is an unjust inequality.
Data shows that in many cases, employers avoid payment even if they
are not formally bankrupt.29 They disappear, move to a different state, or
just do not have any assets and see no need to formally file. There is no
reason why employees of such employers should not enjoy preferential
treatment, while their peers, whose employers did file, do enjoy such a
preference. If a social justification exists for giving preferential
treatment to employees inside bankruptcy, then the same justification
applies outside bankruptcy, as well. An insurance-based model can be
applied both within and outside of bankruptcy. Importantly, the model
would not unjustly discriminate against employees whose employers
decide against filing, and it would not create perverse incentives and
forum shopping for litigants.
Second, an insurance-based model distributes the cost of the
preferential treatment to the employees more justly than a bankruptcy
priority. A bankruptcy priority places the cost of the preferential
treatment on the shoulders of the unsecured creditors. Since the
employees are paid before the other unsecured creditors, the latter have
fewer assets from which to recover, and thus, their recovery rate
decreases.3" The group of unsecured creditors, however, is random and
usually relatively small. Although some of the creditors may be
financially strong, others may be weak and maladjusting. Suppliers,
customers, and certainly tort claimants are not necessarily stronger (or
better adjusting) than employees of the company, and there is no reason
to place the burden of the employees' preference on them. Paying the
employees' pre-bankruptcy claims through an insurance-based solution
25. See Paul M. Secunda, An Analysis of the Treatment of Employee Pension and Wage
Claims in Insolvency and Under Guarantee Schemes in OECD Countries: Comparative Law
Lessonsfor Detroitand the United States, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 867, 875 (2013); infra Part II.B.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 27-35.
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)-(10) (2012); see also infra text accompanying notes 234-35.
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. CHO ET AL., supra note 13, at 2; see also infra notes 226-35.
30. § 507(a)(4)-(5).
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places the cost on the public (all employers and employees). The cost is
broadly spread, and the price each premium payer pays is minor. This
decreases the economic costs of an employer's insolvency, as the
collateral damage caused by the bankruptcy (to suppliers, customers, or
other relatively weak creditors) is smaller.
But why is it justified to place the cost of the preferential treatment
on the general premium paying public, which has nothing to do with the
insolvent employer? Here, we come to the third justification for the
implementation of our suggested model-economic efficiency.3" As will
be detailed further on, the reasons for providing preferential treatment to
the employees are social.32 Society believes that workers, perhaps more
than other creditors, are dependent on payments they receive from their
employers, and it wishes to help them avoid a situation where they work
without pay.33 But exactly because the reasoning behind the wage
priority is social, it is the public's responsibility to pay for it. Placing the
costs on the creditors is inefficient because the public (through the
legislature) chooses the level of priority, yet the costs of this choice are
borne by the unsecured creditors. As a result, the costs of the preference
are not properly taken into account, and the level of preference is not
accurately chosen. This may take a toll on the entire economy because
creditors, in turn, price the bankruptcy priority. A high priority level
increases interest rates, thereby decreasing investments and slowing
down growth.34 An insurance-based model, on the other hand, places the
cost of the preference on the same "entity" that decides the level of the
preference-the public. The model is better able to set the preference at
the level the public desires, thereby enhancing overall economic welfare.
Lastly, an insurance-based solution improves the monitoring of
shirking employers.35 Without the existence of an insurance-based
solution, collection efforts are regularly under provided. They are
expensive and time consuming, and few employees have the required
resources to invest in such proceedings. As a result, employers are able
to avoid payment relatively easily, incentivizing wage theft. An
insurance-based model addresses this problem. Since the insurer would
have the right to collect the money it paid to the unpaid employees from
the employer, it can conduct the collection proceedings itself. The
insurer could aggregate the claims of all unpaid employees, thus,
creating an incentive to invest the required resources in the collection
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part HI.A.
See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. ClIl. L. REv. 775, 790 (1987).
See infra text accompanying notes 192-93.
See infra text accompanying notes 226-35.
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efforts, and could gain knowledge and expertise in the matter. Due to the
prevalence of wage theft in the United States, a strong collection and
enforcement arm is likely in order.
The problem with an insurance-based model appears to be the cost.
Since the fund pays all employees that are unable to collect a favorable
judgment from their employer, there is a danger that its cost will be very
high, and that the high cost will render the solution impractical. This
Article addresses the cost issue, and rejects it from both conceptual and
practical perspectives.36 From a conceptual perspective, this Article
argues that for the same level of preference, an insurance-based model is
not more expensive than a bankruptcy priority model. 3 Both models
entail economic costs, but whereas the costs of a bankruptcy priority are
indirect and opaque, the costs of an insurance-based model are
transparent. In addition, the Article explains that if the public wishes to
decrease the premiums, the legislature should reduce the insurance
coverage rather than use an inefficient model of preference, that is the
bankruptcy priority. From a practical perspective, a rough assessment of
the costs of an insurance-based solution shows that they are definitely
manageable. When examining California, the state for which we have
the most accurate data, we see that full wage assurance coverage should
cost about thirty cents a month per employee-a relatively small
amount, even for employees from a low socio-economic level.3"
Although the figure is a very rough estimation, it clarifies that the fund's
costs do not render its creation financially unjustified.
This Article, thus, makes a valuable contribution-putting forth the
insurance-based model and showing its superiority over the current legal
regime. Note, though, that the argument pertains to the model used for
preferring the wage claims, and not to the question of whether such
preferential treatment should be given in the first place.39 I maintain that
if the public believes that employees' wage claims deserve protection
(and current legislation suggests that it does), then the tool to use is an
insurance-based model and not a bankruptcy priority. If, on the other
hand, the public does not believe employees' wages should be protected,
then no type of preference should be implemented at all-not even a
bankruptcy priority. In any event, the current legal regime, in which only
a bankruptcy priority exists, is wrong.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows: In Part II, the Article
describes the employees' collection problem and outlines the possible
36.
37.
38.
39.

See
See
See
See

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

IV.B.
IV.B.
IV.B.
I.A.
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models of solution.4" Part III argues that the insurance-based model is
superior to a bankruptcy priority in a bankruptcy context and explains
why implementing an insurance-based solution solely in a bankruptcy
setting would be a mistake.4'

II.

THE COLLECTION OF UNPAID WAGES: THE PROBLEM AND
AVAILABLE REMEDIES

A.

The Problem

Wage theft, the practice of denying employees the monetary
compensation they rightfully deserve, has become an epidemic.42 It is a
grave and widespread phenomenon, and some even call it the "defining
trend" of the 21st century labor market.43 A growing body of empirical
research shows that, far from being anecdotal, the wage theft
phenomenon has spread to various locations and to a wide range of
industries." A study conducted in 2008, in Chicago, Los Angeles, and
40. See infra Part 1I.
41. See infra Part HI. This Article deals exclusively with employees' pre-petition claims.
Insofar as the claims are post-petition (claims for workers' salaries during the restructuring period),
I think the claims should be paid from the debtor's assets-at the expense of the other creditors. The
employees' work during the restructuring period facilitates the operation of the debtor as a going
concern. The debtor's continued existence ought to increase its value and, thus, increase the
payment the group of creditors obtains in the insolvency proceedings. Since the group of creditors
benefits from the fruits of the workers' labor, it should also finance it. Charging the cost of salaries
to the debtor's assets also facilitates a more correct choice between liquidation and restructuring
proceedings. It forces the creditors to take into account the costs of restructuring, which in turn
makes them select the restructuring option only if the value gained from the continued existence of
the debtor as a going concern is indeed higher than the costs of operating the company.
42. Rebecca Dixon, Staff Attorney, Nat'l Emp't Law Project, Testimony on Implementation
of the Wage Theft Prevention Act Before the New York State Assembly Standing Committee on
Labor 2 (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/NELP-TestimonyfortheNYS-Assembly-Hearing.pdf.
43.

See HOUS. INTERFAITH WORKER JUSTICE CTR., HOUSTON, WE HAVE A WAGE THEFT

PROBLEM 1, 4-5 (2012) https://stopwagetheft.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/2012-houston-wagetheft-report.pdf; NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 7, at 2.
44. See generally ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, "FORGOTTEN WORKERS": A
STUDY OF LOW-WAGE KOREAN IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE METROPOLITAN NEW YORK AREA

(2006), http://www.aaldef.org/docs/KWP_2006WorkerSurveyanalysis.pdf (maintaining that many
low-wage workers from the Korean community in the New York Metropolitan Area are prone to
experience labor violations, such as not receiving minimum wage or overtime); MARY BAUER, S.
POVERTY L. CTR., UNDER SIEGE: LIFE FOR LOW-INCOME LATINOS IN THE SOUTH (2009),

http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/UnderSiege.pdf (finding that many workers
in the Latino community encounter discrimination and exploitation by being denied their basic labor
rights, such as minimum wage, basic health and safety protections, and others and arguing that state
and local governments have made the situation worse, by leaving workers without the ability to
receive wages that are rightfully theirs); ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT,
BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS (2009), http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/
BrokenLawsReport2009.pdfnocdn=l; ROBERT BRUNO ET AL., UNIV. OF ILL. AT URBANA-
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New York City, shows that twenty-six percent of low-wage workers are
paid less than the minimum wage, and of the more than twenty-five
percent of workers who work over forty hours, more than three quarters
are not paid the legally required overtime. 45 More than two-thirds of the
employees in the sample (a total of 4387 employees) reported at least
one pay-related violation a week prior to the survey, and the average
wage loss translates into fifteen percent of earnings. 46 No less than $56.4
million dollars are lost every week due to wage theft in each of the three
major cities surveyed.47
However, the wage theft phenomenon, albeit grave and important,
is only part of the problem. An ancillary problem, the problem with
which I deal in this Article, is that even when employees receive a
judgment in their favor, in many cases, the judgment remains no more
than a piece of paper.48 The employer avoids, or is unable to pay, the
awarded damages, and the employees fail to enforce their rights.4 9
Cho, Koonse, and Mischel conducted research that looked into the
collection of unpaid wages in California." Their research investigates
wage claims filed to the DLSE and examines how much of their unpaid
wages workers were able to collect. 1 According to their analysis, only

CHAMPAIGN,

CLEAN

CARS,

DIRTY

WORK

(2012),

https://ler.illinois.edu/wp-

content/uploads/2015/01/Clean-Cars-Dirty-WorkBruno-Quesada-Manzo.pdf (surveying employees
working at car washes in Chicago and finding that violations of basic labor laws are common
among car wash employees); CASA OF MD., WAGE THEFT: How MARYLAND FAILS TO PROTECT
THE RIGHTS OF LOW-WAGE WORKERS (2007), http://cdm.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/

documents/wagetheft.pdf (discussing the wage theft epidemic in Maryland); REBEKAH LEVEN &
ROBERT

GINSBURG,

SWEATSHOPS

IN

CHICAGO

(2000),

file:///Users/admin/Downloads/

center for impactresearch 30.pdf (surveying working conditions in low-income immigrant
communities in Chicago, especially in work places that meet the Department of Labor's definition
of sweatshops and concluding that a significant number of employees working in these sweatshops
are deprived of their basic rights, such as minimum wage or overtime, and are exposed to other
federal violations, such as child labor or industrial homework); MUJERES UNIDAS Y ACTIVAS ET
AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: WORKING CONDITIONS OF CALIFORNIA HOUSEHOLD WORKERS
(surveying low(2007), http://www.datacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/behindcloseddoors.pdf
income immigrant Latina women in Califomia, many of whom are domestic workers, and finding
that domestic workers experience many labor violations, such as not getting paid minimum wage or
overtime and not receiving paid work breaks); NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 7; Helene
Jorgensen & Lonnie Golden, Time After Time: Mandatory Overtime in the U.S. Economy, ECON.
POL'Y INST. (Jan. 1, 2002), http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers-bpl20 (confirming that
since at-will workers in the United States can be dismissed for no reason at all, many employees are
"forced" to work overtime out of fear of their dismissal or facing other workplace sanctions).

45. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supranote 44, at 2.
46. Id. at 2, 5.
47. Id. at 6.
48.

See infra text accompanying notes 50-67.

49. See infra text accompanying notes 50-67.
50.

See generally CHO ET AL., supra note 13.

51.

Id. at 1-2.
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seventeen percent of the employees who complete the entire DLSE
process (not including settlement awards) and receive a judgment in
their favor are able to recover any payment from the employer.52
Between the years 2008 and 2011, the DLSE issued decisions for unpaid
wages totaling over $282 million, but "workers were able to collect a
mere $42 million-roughly [fifteen] percent-of those awards."53
Collection rates are better if settlement awards are taken into account,
but even then, fifty-eight percent of the claims are unpaid. 4
The situation in other states is not much different. According to the
Oregon Center for Public Policy, between July 2010 and June 2013 the
Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries issued monetary fines against
employers totaling $6.2 million.55 Employers, however, paid only $1.8
million-twenty-eight percent of the total amount of the judgments
issued against them.5 6 The Houston Interfaith Worker Justice Center, a
Texas non-profit organization designed to support employees, reports a
similar experience. From 2007 to 2012, the organization has
documented more than $3.3 million in stolen wages,5 7 but has been
able to recover only $700,000-just twenty-one percent of the amount
due to the employees. 8 The same situation exists in New York,59

52. Id. at 13-14. "Between 2008 to 2011, 18,683 workers prevailed in their [wage] claims,"
but just 3084 of those workers were able to collect any money. Id.
53. Id.at 2.
54. Id. at 14-15.
55.

OR. CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, supra note 15.

56. Id
57. Hous. INTERFAITH WORKER JUSTICE CTR., supra note 43, at 6. This amount includes
only the data documented by the non-profit agency itself, which, according to the agency's own
report, is only a segment of the monetary scope of wage stolen in Houston. Id.
58. Id. The agency explains this poor collection rate as follows:
Unscrupulous employers can utilize many tactics to avoid payment even after
"conviction" [that is a judgment determining the employer owes the employee money]
by closing bank accounts or businesses and reopening under a new name, transferring
their assets to a family member or under a different name, or filing for bankruptcy.
While in many cases it is possible to pursue collection, an understaffed agency with
limited resources is unlikely to continue an investigation or collection process past the
initial rejection. In turn, this leaves the affected worker with only part of their due wages,
or worse, a favorable court judgment or TWC order-simply a victory on paper.
Id. at 14.
59. Lauren K. Dasse, Note, Wage Theft in New York- The Wage Theft Prevention Act as a
Counter to an Endemic Problem, 16 CUNY L. REV. 97, 116 (2012) ("[L]ow-wage workers [often]
receive a judgment in their favor but never see the money, because, for example, the employer has
transferred his or her assets to someone else, sold the business and moved on, or has disappeared
and is nowhere to be found.").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:107

Florida,60 Iowa 6 1, North Carolina, 62 and presumably many of the other
cities and states that do not publish formal statistics about the recovery
rate of unpaid wage judgments. 63 As Rebecca Dixon, a policy analyst for
the National Employment Law Project, explained in her testimony
before the New York State Assembly Standing Committee on Labor:

60. Andrew Marra, Editorial: Stiffed Workers Still Have Trouble Collecting Pay,
MYPALMBEACHPOST (July 5, 2013, 1:18 PM), http://www.mypalmbeachpost.com/news/news/
opinion/editorial-stiffed-workers-still-have-trouble-colle/nYcxk ("Florida 'is a debtor's paradise,'
says Gregory Schell, managing attorney of Florida Legal Service's Migrant Farmworker Justice
Project. 'Collection is a huge, huge problem, and no matter what system you have, it's hard to
collect."').
61.

COLIN GORDON ET AL., IOWA POLICY PROJECT, WAGE THEFT IN IOWA 17 (2012),

http://www.iowapolicyproject.org/2012docs/120827.wagetheft.pdf. The situation in Iowa is on
scale with the rest of the country:
[E]ven workers who are successful in winning a claim or suing an employer for back
wages often will be faced with the difficulty of collecting a monetary judgment. As Iowa
Workforce Development acknowledges in its guidance to potential claimants, "Gaining a
judgment does not guarantee payment of your claim. The wages must still be collected.
Often, this is not possible." Smaller, "fly by night" employers may have few
visible assets, may close up shop in order to avoid paying a judgment, or may disappear
in bankruptcy.
Id. (footnote call numbers omitted).
62.

SABINE SCHOENBACH ET AL., N.C. JUSTICE CTR. & UNC IMMIGRATION/HUMAN RIGHTS

POLICY CLINIC, "IT DOESN'T ADD UP" 25 (2012), http://www.ncjustice.org/sites/default/files/
WageTheft Report-lt_doesntadd up.pdf ("Even if employees are able to access the complaint
process, the collection of lost wages is often challenging.... Providing a simple way for workers to
place liens on employers who fail to pay wages can be an effective tool for fast recovery of wages
owed.").
63. As part of the research for this Article, my research assistant and I sent e-mails to labor
commissioners in all fifty states, asking them for data regarding the collection rate of employment
claims in their state. Unfortunately, the vast majority of states (forty-two) did not respond, and those
who did failed to provide most of the data for which we were looking. The labor commissioners in
Kentucky and New Hampshire wrote that the data about collection rates was unavailable. E-mail
from Karen J. Triplett Meier, Office of Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Workers' Claims, to Nataly Damary,
Faculty of Law, Haifa Univ. (May 1, 2013) (on file with the author) (Kentucky); E-mail from
Martin Jenkins, Legal Counsel, N.H. Dep't of Labor, to Nataly Damary, Faculty of Law, Haifa
Univ. (May 14, 2014) (on file with the author) (New Hampshire). Wage commissioners in Alaska,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, and South Dakota gave the amount of collected wages (in cases
where wage violations were reported), but did not report the total amount of the claims. E-mail from
Joe Dunham, Statewide Supervising Investigator, Wage & Hour Admin., to Nataly Damary, Faculty
of Law, Haifa Univ. (Apr. 26, 2014) (on file with the author) (Alaska); E-mail from Denise P.
Oxley, Gen. Counsel, Ark. Dep't of Labor, to Nataly Damary, Faculty of Law, Haifa Univ. (Apr.
24, 2014) (on file with the author) (Arkansas); E-mail from Gary K. Pechie, Dir., Conn. Dep't of
Labor, to Nataly Damary, Faculty of Law, Haifa Univ. (Apr. 23, 2014) (on file with the author)
(Connecticut); E-mail from James E. Marsh, Dir., S.D. Dep't of Labor and Regulation, to Nataly
Damary, Faculty of Law, Haifa Univ. (Apr. 28, 2014) (on file with the author) (South Dakota). The
labor commissioner in Nebraska was the only commissioner that provided all of the information
requested. E-mail from John H. Albin, Agency Legal Counsel, Neb. Dep't of Labor, to Nataly
Damary, Faculty of Law, Haifa Univ. (May 2, 2014) (on file with the author). In Nebraska, the total
amount of the wage claims during Fiscal Year 2012-2013 was $785,498, and employees were
unable to recover 15.4% of this amount-120,997. Id.
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Right now, it's all too common that a worker successfully brings a
wage theft claim, only to see the employer declare bankruptcy, leave
town, close shop or otherwise evade paying up. If we want workers
to come forward,
we have to show that we can get them their
64
unpaid wages.
Indeed, many workers, even after they summon up the courage to
file a complaint and ultimately win a judgment, never get paid. The
unpaid employees have difficulties chasing after the shirking employer,
and, even if they do find the employer, as in the Hill Enterprises
example in the Introduction, the employer may have no assets to give
them.65 The employer is bankrupt, the business is gone, and the
employees have no financial resources from which to recover.
According to Cho, Koonse, and Mischel, sixty percent of the employers
who received a judgment against them in California have "abandoned,
transferred or sold their businesses" before, or soon after, the judgment
ordering them to pay their employees was given.6 6 Fifty percent of
these employers did so before the workers could even complete the
judicial process.67

Unfortunately, the employees who suffer from this problem often
come from weak socio-economic backgrounds.68 Those employees, the
weakest stakeholders, depend on the wages they receive from their
employer for their basic needs, and with little savings, they cannot afford
to get less than full compensation.69 Although the dollar amounts of each
employment claim may be small, for these hard working employees
every dollar counts, and even one month of unpaid wages can make the
70
difference between relative financial stability and homelessness.
The legal system does offer workers who have a winning judgment
in their hands some mechanisms for easier collection when compared to
other creditors. 71 These solutions afford employees a priority over other
creditors or an additional source from which to collect their debts.72 The
problem is that the main solution offered-the bankruptcy priority-is

64. See Dixon, supranote 42, at 3-4.
65. See Wenger, supra note 1.
66.

CHO ET AL., supra note 13, at 14.

67. Id. at 14.
68. See NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO
STATE AND CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT WAGE THEFT 111-12 (2011), http://www.nelp.org/content

uploads/2015/03/WinningWageJustice201 .pdf; Dixon, supra note 42, at 3.
69. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 44, at 21-26; NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note
68, at 111-12.
70. See SCHOENBACH ET AL., supra note 62, at 2-3.
71. See infra Part I.B.
72. See infra Part n.B-C.
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not very efficient, and the other, more efficient, solutions have been
adopted only by a few states. In the following sections, we will outline
the available solutions and show the dominant role the Bankruptcy Code
plays in the legislation and in the literature.73
B. The CurrentSolutions to the Collection Problem:An Outline
The most important, and by far the most deliberated, solution to the
employees' collection problem is the wage priority given in the
Bankruptcy Code.74 Sections 507(a)(4) and 507(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code prioritize wage claims so that the holders of such claims are paid
in full, before most other unsecured creditors receive anything for
their claims.

75

Section 507(a)(4) is available for allowed unsecured

claims for wages, salaries, and commissions, including overtime,
vacation, severance, and sick leave pay earned by an individual.7 6
Section 507(a)(5) is available for allowed claims for contribution to an
employee benefit plan.77 Both priorities, however, are limited in dollar
amount and time.78 In terms of amount, § 507(a)(4) is limited to claims
of up to $12,475. 79 Any amount exceeding this maximum limit will be
considered a regular unsecured claim, even if it is a claim for wages,
salaries, or commissions."0 Section 507(a)(5) is limited to $12,475 minus
the amount paid to the employee under § 507(a)(4)."' This means that, in
73. See infra Part II.B-C.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4H5) (2012).
75. Id.; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 507.06 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2015).
76. § 507(a)(4); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 75, 507.06[2]. It is also available for
sales commissions and bonuses, "so long as the bonus is in the nature of compensation for work
performed." COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 75, 507.06[2]. A corporation can also have an
allowed claim for sales commissions if the corporation has only one employee, and it is "acting as
an independent contractor in the sale of goods and services for the debtor in the ordinary course of
the debtor's business." § 507(a)(4)(B).
77. § 507(a)(5). The legislature did not define the term "employee benefit plan," but it is
understood to mean "pension plans, health insurance plans, and life insurance plans." COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 75, 507.07[l]. According to the Supreme Court decision in Howard
Delivery Service, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co., a worker's compensation plan does not
qualify as an employee benefit plan, because the premiums do not constitute compensation (direct
or indirect) to the employee. 547 U.S. 651, 655 (2006).
78. See § 507(a)(4)-(5).
79. § 507(a)(4); Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code Prescribed
Under Section 104(a) of the Code, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,089, 12,090 (Feb. 21, 2013); COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 75, 507.06.
80. See § 507(a)(4); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 75, 507.06. The dollar amount
limitation is adjusted every three years to account for the changes in the cost of living. See 11
U.S.C. § 104 (2012).
81. § 507(a)(5)(B); Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code Prescribed
Under Section 104(a) of the Code, 78 Fed. Reg. at 12,090.
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any event, an employee cannot receive more than $12,475 as a priority
claim for both sections. In terms of time, to receive a priority under
§§ 507(a)(4) and 507(a)(5) the claims must be earned within 180 days
before the date of filing the petition or the date the debtor ceased
business, whichever is earlier.8 2 Claims for wages or benefit plan
contributions earned before this time are treated as general unsecured
claims and will not give the employees any priority.83
Note, though, that even when wage claims are within the prescribed
amount and timing limits, their payment is still conditioned on the value
of the debtor's assets. If the debtor (employer) has very few assets, or if
its assets are already tied up as security for other creditors, then the value
of the estate may be insufficient to pay employees despite their
priority. 4 In this case, both the regular unsecured creditors and the
employees will get nothing, and the priority will do the unpaid employee
little good. Several states, therefore, have developed additional
mechanisms designed to help employees collect unpaid wages.8 5 The
enforcement mechanisms adopted by the states can be divided into three
categories: wage liens, bond funds, and wage assurance funds.8 6 All
three categories are designed to improve employees' chances of
receiving the debt owed to them by their employers, but the tools they
use to do so are different.
A wage lien is a statutory lien filed in case of non-payment of
wages or other employment related claims.8 7 The lien gives employees a
direct claim against employers' property (including real estate or bank
accounts), and thereby elevates their position from priority creditors to
secured creditors.88 It increases the employees' collection rate, and
82. § 507(a)(4)-(5).
83. See id.
84. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 86-110 and accompanying text.
86. See NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 68, at 112.
87. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.440 (2014); IDAHO CODE § 45-620 (2015); ME. STAT. tit.
26, § 52 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 514.59 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.720 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 275:51 (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 1971 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.48.086
(2014); WIS. STAT. § 109.09(2) (2015).
88. See Richard H. Nowka & Jeff. S. Taylor, Kentucky Employees' Wage Liens: A Sneak
Attack on Creditors, but Beware of the Bankruptcy Trustee, 84 Ky. L.J. 317, 318-20 (1995-1996);
Matthew L. Seror, Note, Analyzing the Inadequacies of Employee Protections in Bankruptcy, 13 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 141, 150-52 (2003-2004) (examining the court's treatment of wage liens). The
procedure required to attach the wage lien varies from state to state. In some states, like Alaska, the
unpaid employee can file for a lien within ninety days of non-payment of wages, even prior to a
court or an administrative agency ruling on the employer's liability. ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.440. In
other states, like Idaho, an administrative agency must recognize the employer's liability before the
lien is attached. IDAHO CODE §§ 45-617, 45-620 (2015). In addition, some states limit the protection
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pressures the employer to pay their debts to erase the lien. 9 According
to a study conducted by the National Employment Law Project ("NELP
Study"), a general wage lien, which is available to all employees, is
adopted only by a handful of states.9" Most states have some form of a
mechanic's lien, which covers work that involves the improvement of
real property, but the vast majority of employees cannot take advantage
of these types of liens. 91 Even when available, by definition, the wage
lien is linked to the debtors' assets. Thus, if the debtor does not have any
assets, the worker cannot attach a lien and cannot enjoy the security
afforded by the wage lien statute.
A second mechanism to aid the employees' collection is a wage
bond. This option requires employers to post a bond with a state agency
to protect the wages and benefits of their workers.9 2 In case of nonpayment, the existence of the bond, which is dedicated to this purpose,
ensures that the employees have sufficient capital from which to
recover. 93 According to the NELP Study, thirty-eight states require that
employers post wage bonds, but the requirement typically applies only
to public works or construction companies. 94 Only "[a] few states require
bonds in other industries, including garment (California), entertainment
(Nevada),... or mining (Illinois)," and no state requires all employers to
post wage bonds for their entire work force. 95 The problem with a wage
bond requirement, and probably the reason why it is implemented in so
few industries, is that it demands employers to put up a large sum of
money upfront. The value of the bond should be of sufficient amount to
cover all potential wage claims, and although a bond typically costs only
a certain percentage of the amount it guarantees, the cost to the employer
can be substantial.96 New or small businesses will have particular
difficulties raising sufficient funds for the bond, and an overarching
requirement to post wage bonds is likely to discourage entrepreneurship
or push businesses towards insolvency.
that can be afforded by the lien. Wisconsin, for example, caps the maximum amount of recovery to
up to six months of wages and to no more than $3000. WIS. STAT. § 109.09(2).
89. The lien prevents the employer from selling or transferring the assets to which the lien is
attached, and thereby it ensures the employee will have assets from which to recover.
90. See NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 68, at 114-15.
91. Id. at 113.
92. Seeidat ll2.
93. JOHN W. ROURKE ET AL., ELEVENTH ANNUAL NORTHEAST SURETY AND FIDELITY
CLAIMS CONFERENCE: A SURVEY OF PREVAILING WAGE LAWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE

SURETY 2-3 (2000), http://www.forcon.com/userfiles/file/nesfcc/2000/06.Rourke.pdf.
94. NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supranote 68, at 117; see ROURKE ET AL., supranote 93, at
9-34 (discussing each state's approach).
95.

See NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 68, at 118.

96. Id. at 117.
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A third option to assist employees, therefore, is an insurance-based
model.97 Under an insurance-based model, the state creates or designates
a wage assurance fund from which employees can collect their
employment claims in case of non-payment.9" When an employee has a
judgment in her favor, but her employer cannot (or refuses to) pay it, the
fund pays the unpaid employee her wages (or other employment claims)
in lieu of the insolvent employer.99 The fund is financed by fees imposed
on the employees, employers, or both. ° All employees and employers
pay a certain premium to the fund, and the fund uses the pool of
premiums to pay the deserving employees. 0 1 The fund, therefore,
functions as a wage insurer. The insured public (employees and
employers) pays a small monthly fee, and in return, the fund guarantees
that all employees will be able to collect justified wage claims regardless
of their employers' financial condition. 2 The wage assurance fund,
thus, shifts the risk allocations; it transfers the risk of non-payment from
the employees of a certain employer (debtor) to the general public of
employers and employees-those who pay the premiums. Note, though,
that as opposed to a regular insurance scheme, this insurance should be
mandatory. Employers and employees should not be able to opt out of
this insurance policy, and all of them should be required to pay the
designated premiums. 0 3 In a sense, therefore, the premiums resemble a
tax or fee. They are deducted from employers' and employees' income,
and serve a public purpose-the protection of employees' claims."
97. Id. at 120; see EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY 13 (R. Blanpain & A.T.J.M. Jacobs
eds., 2002).
98. See EMPLOYEE RIGHTS INBANKRUPTCY, supra note 97, at 13. There are several possible
models of establishing a wage assurance fund. One option is to create a state fund, which is
managed and operated by state officials. Another option is to use private insurance companies,
which compete to provide the wage assurance to the employees. This second option uses private
market forces to decrease the insurance price, akin to other mandatory liability insurance schemes.
99. The wage fund solves the employees' collection difficulties because it is not connected to
the employer's assets. Even in a case where the employer has few or no assets, the fund can still pay
the unpaid employees.
OF

100. JANIS SARRA, RECOGNIZING WORKERS' ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS: THE TREATMENT
EMPLOYEE AND PENSION CLAIMS DURING COMPANY INSOLVENCY 25 (2008),

http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/572/5379.html;

see EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN

BANKRUPTCY, supra note 97, at 13, 19; NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supranote 68, at 120-23.
101.

See EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY, supra note 97, at 13.

102. Id.
103. Cf. Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARv. L. REV.
1393, 1415, 1418 (1985) (explaining Jackson's views of consumer bankruptcy law as a type of a
mandatory insurance policy).
104. In some countries, the fund is subsidized, in whole or in part, by the state. See SARRA,
supra note 100, at 25. Instead of, or in addition to, the premiums paid by employees and employers,
the state finances the fund's activities from its own resources. See id I object to this type of funding,
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Despite the potential of wage assurance funds to help employees, in
the United States, only Oregon and Maine use this mechanism, and even
then, on a very limited basis.1" 5 In Oregon, employees can recover from
the fund up to $4000 in wage claims, when their employer ceases doing
business and does not have the resources to pay them.' 06 Maine follows a
similar model, but employees can recover up to two weeks wages rather
than a certain limited dollar amount. 0 7 As opposed to the United States,
in many other OECD countries, wage assurance funds are much more
prevalent.'0 8 The European Council, for example, issued a directive that
obligates all member states to set up a wage assurance fund to help
employees when their employer is bankrupt.'09 The models in which the
different funds operate differ from country to country, but in all
countries, the funds insure at least part of the employees' unpaid
wage claims. 0
C. Bankruptcy Law as the PrimaryMechanism
to Protect UnpaidEmployees
While various mechanisms are available to improve the collection
of employment claims, as the description above shows, in the United
States there is a focus on the bankruptcy model. Most states do not offer
unpaid employees any special collection privileges, and they rely on the
priority given by the federal Bankruptcy Code to help employees when
their employers file for bankruptcy."' This focus on bankruptcy law is
shared by Congress and by legal literature." 2 Both largely ignore the
other possible solutions for the employees' collection problem and view
this problem through the narrow prism of bankruptcy law.
however, and believe the fund should be financed solely from premiums-just like a regular
insurance policy. For reasons that shall be elaborated further below, there should be a legal and
visible connection between the amounts paid to the fund by the public and the amounts paid by the
fund to the unpaid employees. See infra notes 180-97 and accompanying text. State subsidies
interfere with this link and are liable to cause imbalances in the fund's finances. See Secunda, supra
note 25, at 936 & n.333.
105. ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 632 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.409 (2013); see NAT'L EMP'T LAW
PROJECT, supranote 68, at 121.
106. OR. REV. STAT. § 652.414(1)-(2).
107. ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 632(1).
108. See Secunda, supra note 25, at 875, 903-04.
109. Council Directive 2008/94/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 283) 36-40. Council Directive 2008/94/EC
originated from an earlier directive, adopted in 1980-Council Directive 1980/987/EEC, 1980 O.J.
(L 283) 23-25. See Nicolae Voiculescu, Developments in the Community Legislative Protection of
Employees in the Event of Employer Insolvency, 8 ANALELE UNIVERSITATII TITU MAIORESCU 76,
76-77 (2009) (Rom.).
110. See generally Secunda, supra note 25.
111. See supra Part 11.
112. See infra notes 113-48 and accompanying text.
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The emphasis Congress places on bankruptcy law is reflected by
the constant broadening of the bankruptcy priority's scope and by the
rhetoric used by Congressmen in the legislation process.' 13 Ever since
the wage priority was first introduced in 1841, the amount of allowed
claims has continuously grown. 114 In 1841, Congress capped the amount
of the allowed priority at $25 ($700 in today's purchasing power), and
gradually the amount has risen to the present cap of $12,475."1
However, not only has the dollar amount of the allowed claims changed,
so have the types of claims and their possible beneficiaries. On several
occasions, usually after bankruptcy courts narrowly interpreted the wage
priority, Congress responded by amending the bankruptcy laws. In 1938,
Congress clarified that not only do salary claims enjoy the priority, but
so can commissions received by "part-time and non-exclusive
salesmen.""' 6 In 1978, in response to the Supreme Court rulings in
United States v. Embassy Restaurant,Inc.117 and Joint Industry Boardof
8 Congress added
the ElectricalIndustry v. United States,"1
§ 507(a)(5) to
cover contributions to employees' benefit plans." 9 In 1994, Congress
113. See infra text accompanying notes 114-25.
114. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, §§ 2, 5, 5 Stat. 440, 442, 445 (repealed 1843); see infra note
115 and accompanying text.
115. Id.; Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code Prescribed Under
Section 104(a) of the Code, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,089, 12,090 (Feb. 21, 2013). See generally C. Scott
Pryor, The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Perspectives on the Wage Priority in Bankruptcy, 16 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 121 (2008). In 1867, the limit was increased to $50 ($825 in today's
purchasing power). Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 27, 14 Stat. 517, 529-30 (repealed 1878). In
1898, the limit was increased to $300 ($8830 in today's purchasing power), but only if earned
within three months prior to the filing. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 64(b)(4), 30 Stat. 544, 563. In
1926, the limit was increased to $600 ($8020 in today's purchasing power). Act of May 27, 1926,
ch. 406, sec. 15, § 64(b)(5), 44 Stat. 662, 667 (amending the Act of July 1, 1898). In 1978, the limit
again increased to $1800 ($6530 in today's purchasing power). Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 507(a)(3), 92 Stat. 2549, 2583 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2012)). In 1994, the
limit once again caught up to inflation, as it climbed to $4000 ($6390 in today's purchasing power).
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, sec. 108(c), § 507(a), 108 Stat. 4106, 4112.
In 2005, the amount again changed to $10,000, if earned 180 days prior to filing instead of only
three months. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), sec.
1401, § 507(a), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, 214. Today the amount stands at $12,475, due to
the cost of living adjustment prescribed in § 104 of the United States Code. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 104(a), 507(a)(4); Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code Prescribed Under
Section 104(a) of the Code, 78 Fed. Reg. at 12,090. Present purchasing power was calculated using
an online calculator. MEASURINGWORTH.COM, http://www.measuringworth.com/ppowerus (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015).
116. SeePryor,supranote115, at 137.
117. 359 U.S. 29, 29-30, 34-35 (1959) (holding that payments due to a welfare fund intended
to cover life insurance, weekly sick benefits, and medical benefits for union members did not fall
under the wage priority).
118. 391 U.S. 224, 225, 228-29 (1968) (holding that payments due to an annuity fund for
electrical workers did not fall under the wage priority).
119. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supranote 75, 507.07; see also Pryor, supranote 115, at

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:107

resolved a split amongst the courts by integrating commissions owed to
independent contractors in the wage priority.1 E° This trend of increasing
the scope of employees' protection in bankruptcy continues in the
current Congress. In 2013, Congressman John Conyers, Jr. introduced a
bill entitled "Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcy
Act of 2013" ("PERBBA") to the Congress, and suggested broadening
the employees' protection. 121 According to the PERBBA, the priority
payment to employees' claims should increase from $12,475 to $20,000,
and the restriction that the wage and benefits must be earned within 180
days of the bankruptcy filing should be eliminated. 122 The PERBBA was
123
assigned to a congressional committee, but died without any vote.
From congressional discussions during the legislation of the above
amendments, though, it is clear that members of Congress view
124
bankruptcy law as the only possible tool to protect unpaid employees.
Other possible models, and in particular an insurance-based model, were
not even considered, and Congress reverted to the bankruptcy wage
125
priority to address the plight of the American worker.
138-40 (discussing the Court's hesitance to expand the wage priority from the bench).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)(B); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supranote 75, 507.06[3][b].
121. Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2013, H.R. 100,
113th Cong., §§ 1-2 (2013).
122. Id.at sec. 101, § 507(a).
123. See H.R. 100 (113th): Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies,
GovTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hrlOO#overview (last visited Nov. 22,
2015).
124. See 147 CONG. REC. 3737 (Mar. 15, 2001).
125. See 147 CONG. REc. 3755 (Mar. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Senator Edward
Kennedy explains the rationale of the bankruptcy priority and the need to increase the priority
as follows:
Amending the bankruptcy bill to protect the back pay of workers is especially
appropriate, because back pay awards help many of the people that this legislation places
at risk, low income families, minorities, and women. My amendment helps workers take
care of their families. Collecting a back pay award would give them more of the
resources they need to afford food, clothing, and health care without turning to
credit cards.
Id. Senators John Rockefeller and Patrick Leahy introduced an amendment, co-sponsored by
Senators Mark Dayton and Barack Obama, suggesting the maximum dollar amount of the preferred
employees' claims be raised to $15,000. See 151 CONG. REC. 3180 (Mar. 2, 2005) (statement of
Sen. Rockefeller). The amendment failed-as mentioned above, the wage priority limit passed in
2005 was $10,000-but during the debate, they explained as follows:
In the simplest terms, employees sell their labor to companies. They toil away in
offices and plants and factories and mills and mines because they are promised that at the
end of the day they will receive a certain compensation. Many workers then have a
difficult time recovering what is owed to them by their employer when their company, as
so often happens these days, files for bankruptcy.
Under current law, employees are entitled to a priority claim of up to $4,925. That is
it. The legislation we are debating would increase that claim to $10,000, which is better.
But even that figure is usually not enough to cover the back wages, vacation time,
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Much of the legal literature shares the same line of thought, albeit
with less pathos. Many legal scholars agree that employees deserve a
higher level of protection than other creditors, and they see the
bankruptcy priority as the most appropriate means to obtain such
protection. Elizabeth Warren (now Senator Warren), for example,
justifies the bankruptcy priority for employees by maintaining that many
employees are ill suited to bear the costs of defaults and that the
bankruptcy priority reflects a concern for these employees.' 2 6 For the
same reasons, David Skeel has advocated an increase in the priority
amount. Skeel argues that Congress should either increase the ceiling for
the priority, or at least treat severance promises separately and give
priority treatment to the entire benefit package.127 Donald Korobkin does
not propose to increase the employees' payment ceiling, but suggests
allowing earlier payments to employees. 128 Currently, pre-petition debts
to the employees are paid when the debtor's estate is distributed;
severance pay, or payment benefits the employees are owed for work done prior
to the bankruptcy.
Id. When introducing the bill for Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act
of 2013, Representative Conyers also explained:
[T]hroughout our Nation's history, hardworking American men and women have labored
to make our businesses become the most productive and dynamic in the world.
Unfortunately, when some of these businesses encounter financial difficulties and seek
to reorganize their debts under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, these very same
workers and retirees are often asked to make major sacrifices through lost job
protections, lower wages, and the elimination of hard-won pension and
health benefits ....
Particularly now, as our economy continues to struggle and more businesses falter,
we must do more to ensure that America's most important resource-workers and
retirees-are treated more fairly when these businesses seek to reorganize their financial
affairs under the protection of our bankruptcy laws.
159 CONG. REc. E5 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2013) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
126. Warren, supra note 33, at 790. In her analysis, Warren stated:
Employees are among the creditors least likely to have spread the risks of default. They
seldom are able to contract with several different employers, and losing a paycheck will
quickly deplete modest savings. The Bankruptcy Code reflects a concern for these
creditors, granting a priority to limited employee wage and retirement fund payments.
Id.
127. David A. Skeel, Jr., Employees, Pensions,and Governance in Chapter 11, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1469, 1472 (2004). In his 2004 article, Skeel stated:
Because the limited priority applies not only to past due wages, but also to severance
pay, employees who are fired before bankruptcy may lose both their job and the funds
that might otherwise have tided them over. The most obvious solution to this problem is
to increase the ceiling for the priority. A similar but more nuanced approach would treat
severance promises separately, and give the entire benefit package priority treatment.
Id.
128. Donald R. Korobkin, Employee Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5,
10 (1996) ("In some cases, a worker may face particularly dire consequences if she does not obtain
immediate payment of overdue wages. Furthermore, a debtor may need to pay prepetition wage
claims as a response to plausible threats of employee defection or work stoppages.").
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Korobkin believes that the employees, or at least some of them, should
be paid earlier.129 Even Alan Schwartz, one of the most prominent law
and economics scholars, wrote in favor of the bankruptcy wage
priority. 130 Schwartz views the wage priority as compensation for the
losses employees suffer as a result of the bankruptcy and, in particular,
the loss of their employment in liquidation. 31 He suggests increasing the
wage priority and even rethinking its status below
amount of the allowed
32
creditors.
secured
Other scholars, Douglas Baird and Daniel Keating in particular,
have advocated the opposite view. Contrary to the literature discussed
above, Baird and Keating object to the bankruptcy priority, and explain
that it creates forum shopping and bankruptcy abuse. 133 The solution to
the employees' plight, they argue, should not be bankruptcy specific, but
rather should be rooted in the general labor policy. 134 1 agree with Baird
and Keating's argument, but wish to take the argument one step further.
I propose the implementation of an insurance-based model and maintain
that it is a more efficient and a more just solution. The model should
apply both within and outside of bankruptcy, and it should help all
unpaid employees with winning judgments in their hands.
For methodological purposes, though, this Article divides the
argument into two parts. First, I explain why an insurance-based solution
135
I
is superior to a bankruptcy priority within a bankruptcy context.
describe why a wage assurance fund is a better tool to achieve the very
purposes a bankruptcy priority is designed to achieve, and why a
premium-paying public should bear the costs of the employees'
preferential treatment. 136 Then, the Article relaxes the assumption of the
129.
130.

Id.
Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities,18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 256-57 (1989) ("The

appropriate legal response to this concern is to increase the value of the wage priority by retaining
its current senior rank to unsecured lenders or by raising the $2000 limit.... [T]he current ranking
of employees below secured parties in bankruptcy distribution should be rethought.").
131. Id.
132. Id.; see also Amy Lassiter, Note, Mayday, Mayday!: How the Current Bankruptcy Code
Fails to Protect the Pensions of Employees, 93 KY. L.J. 939, 954 (2004-2005) ("It would accord

with this principle to elevate employees'

claims in bankruptcy to superpriority unsecured

claims...."); Seror, supra note 88, at 142 ("The special treatment prescribed in the Code

for employees is justified by the unique position they find themselves in when their employer
goes bankrupt.").
133. Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 815, 826-29 (1987); Daniel Keating, The Fruits of Labor: Worker
Prioritiesin Bankruptcy, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 905, 907, 910-12, 926 (1993).
134. Baird, supra note 133, at 822-24; Daniel Keating, Ten Lessons for Congress to Ponder
About the Labor/BankruptcyIntersection, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 35, 38-40 (2014).
135. See infra Part l.B.
136. See infra Part lIA-B.
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debtor's bankruptcy, and explains why I believe the solution should be
expanded to non-bankruptcy situations as well.' 3 7
III.

ELIMINATING THE BANKRUPTCY WAGE PRIORITY IN FAVOR OF AN
INSURANCE-BASED MODEL

Looking at this problem from a global perspective, and following
139
138
comparative analyses made by Gordon Johnson and Paul Secunda,
this Article divides the various approaches to the preference of unpaid
wages into four broad categories. This taxonomy uses the two main
models of protection discussed thus far-bankruptcy priorities and
wage assurance funds-and examines which country uses which model
of protection.
According to Secunda, the vast majority of OECD countries use
both models of protection in conjunction with each other. 40 The exact
hybrid each country creates is different, but most OECD countries, such
as Canada, the United Kingdom, France, or England, combine both a
bankruptcy priority and a wage assurance fund."4 ' A second approach,
adopted by Chile, Mexico, and the United States, uses only a bankruptcy
priority model. 42 In the United States, there is a federal wage priority in
bankruptcy, but only two states have a wage assurance fund.' 43 A third
approach, implemented in Germany and Finland, uses only an insurancebased model,' 44 and a fourth approach affords no preference to prepetition employment claims at all.'45
I argue in favor of the third approach. Like Germany and Finland, I
believe no bankruptcy priority should be given to pre-petition wage
claims, and that the protection should be facilitated solely through an
insurance-based model. To clarify this view, I differentiate between two
related questions: First, should employees, in their capacity as creditors,
be preferred over other creditors? Second, to the extent that the answer
to the first question is affirmative, what type of precedence should the
employees receive?

137. See infra Part IV.A-B.
138. Gordon W. Johnson, Insolvency and Social Protection: Employee Entitlements in the
Event of Employer Insolvency, in ASIAN INSOLVENCY Sys. 223, 226-28 (2007).
139. See Secunda, supranote 25, at 874.
140. Id.at 875.
141. Id.at 874-75.
142. See id.
at 874.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
144. Secunda, supra note 25, at 874.
145. See SARRA, supra note 100, at 10.
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The Rationaleof GrantingPrecedencefor Employees' Claims

The notion that employees should be preferred over other creditors
is by no means clear. There are those who argue that giving such a
creditors, including the debtor's
preference is mistaken, and that all
46
workers, should be treated equally. 1
Giving a priority claim to employees, like giving a priority claim to
any other group of creditors, violates one of the most basic principles of
bankruptcy law-the equality principle. 47 The equality principle
presumes that all unsecured creditors should receive an equal pro-rata
share of the bankruptcy estate, and allowing employees to be paid before
any other unsecured creditors clearly violates an equal distribution
scheme. 148 Although deviation from the equality principle can be
justified by the employees' socio-economic weakness, 149 an employee is
not necessarily weaker or more vulnerable than the other creditors. On
the contrary, an employee may have a solid financial background or may
easily find an alternative equal paying job, while other creditors, such as
bondholders, suppliers, or customers, may be of poor economic
background and may be financially dependent on the debtor. 5 ° In other
words, the employees' perceived weakness is not necessarily a good
enough reason for the violation of the equality principle. All creditors
suffer from the debtor's insolvency (under no fault of their own), and
without a clear measure of who is weaker or who will suffer

146. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
147. See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990); David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and
the Creditors'Bargain,61 U. CIN. L. REv. 453,462 (1992). For a discussion on the elusive nature of
the equality principle and classifications in bankruptcy, see generally Thomas C. Given & Linda J.
Philipps, Equality in the Eye of the Beholder-Classiicationof Claims and Interests in Chapter 11
Reorganizations,43 OHIO ST. L.J. 735 (1982).
148. See Rizwaan Jamed Mokal, Priorityas Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth, 60 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 581, 586-87, 590-95 (2001). Different scholars and different strands of bankruptcy literature
justify the principle of equality differently. The contractual (procedural) approach to bankruptcy
views the principle of equality as part of a creditors' bargain. The creditors hypothetically agree to
divide the debtor's assets on an equal pro-rata basis, because this rule reduces their destructive race
to the assets and decreases monitoring costs. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF

BANKRUPTCY LAW 16-17, 30-32 (1986). Traditional, more social approaches view the principle of
equality as part of a theory of justice. It connects to the principles of fairness expressed by
philosopher John Rawls, as it prevents discrimination of one creditor over the other. See generally
Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REv. I.
149. See 147 CONG. REC. 3755 (Mar. 15, 2001)(statement of Sen. Kennedy).
150. Suppliers, for example, rely on the debtor's continued business. When a supplier's buyer
enters bankruptcy, the supplier's own business can also suffer a severe income shock-a shock that
is not necessarily easier than that of the debtor's employees.
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more from non-payment, all creditors should bear the costs of the
insolvency equally.1 51
Moreover, granting employees a priority might create distorted
incentives for the parties involved in the bankruptcy. Employees may
prefer the employer to declare bankruptcy, so that they receive payment
in full, while other creditors are likely to oppose such proceedings to
prevent employees from obtaining a higher payment at their expense. It
is, therefore, preferable to treat all unsecured creditors equally, so as to
not let any priority given to the different claims impact the type of
52
insolvency proceedings chosen. 1
Despite these arguments, according to a survey conducted by the
International Labor Organization, the vast majority of countries do give
preference to the employees.' 5 3 The model of preference may change
from country to country (whether it be a bankruptcy priority or a wage
assurance fund), but the belief that employees are entitled to at least
some kind of preference is widespread.5 4 Only two countries among
those researched, Estonia and the United Arab Emirates, have opted for
the fourth model mentioned above, and decided that employees deserve
no preference. 5
The reasons for this widespread choice, I believe, are threefold.
First, the salary that employees receive from their employers generally
represents a significant portion of their income. Not receiving wages,
especially over several months, is likely to put employees in a very
difficult position and even impair their ability to pay for basic needs,
such as food and housing.' 56 In addition, unlike other creditors
(including suppliers and customers), employees cannot diversify their
employment to reduce the risk they take in the event of their employer's
insolvency. Quite naturally, they usually work for a single
employer, and the collapse of this employer is likely to cause them
57
considerable harm. 1
151. See F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1407 (1986);
Richard A. Ippolito, Bankruptcy and Workers: Risks, Compensation and Pension Contracts, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 1251, 1260 (2004).
152. See Baird, supra note 133, at 817-18; Keating, supranote 133, at 926.
153. See SARRA, supra note 100, at 9. For a comprehensive survey of the different protection
models available in the different countries, see Int'l Labour Org., Comm. of Experts on the
Application of Conventions & Recommendations, International Labour Conference, 91st Session
2003, Report III (Part 1B): General Survey of the Reports Concerning the Protection of Wages
Convention (No. 95) and the Protection of Wages Recommendation (No. 85), 1949, 165-98,
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc91/pdf/rep-iii-lb.pdf.
154. See Int'l Labour Org., supra note 153, at 167.
155. See SARRA,supra note 100, at 10.
156. See Keating, supra note 133, at 907.
157. See Korobkin, supranote 128, at 6.
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Second, as against other commercial creditors, it is difficult to
perceive employees as willingly taking on the risk of their employer's
potential insolvency. Banks, bondholders, and, to a certain degree, even
suppliers and customers, have all elected to invest in the debtor. They
could gather information about the company, assess its commercial
situation, and price the risk involved in extending credit. The higher the
risk they take, the higher the interest rate these creditors charge or the
better the commercial conditions they demand. Employees, on the other
hand, are maladjusting creditors.158 They often have limited accurate
information about the commercial situation of their employer, and it is
doubtful they are able to obtain such information independently.'59 Even
in situations in which the employees do have the required information, it
is not clear that they are able to use it. Workers usually do not price the
risk of their employer's insolvency into their salaries, and they can
hardly change their terms of employment when an employer is going
down.16 ° This is especially true in the case of weaker or older
employees, or in areas of high unemployment. In such cases, the balance
of power clearly tilts to the side of the employer. When on the verge of
insolvency, an employer can take advantage of its leverage and not pay
its workers their full wages. 161
as
Third, non-payment to employees adversely affects the economy 162
a whole and the local communities in which the unpaid workers live.
As mentioned, the victims of wage theft are often employees from low
socio-economic backgrounds. 163 These employees spend a large portion
of their income on basic needs, such as food, clothing, and housing, and
these funds circulate back into the economy, supporting businesses and,
thus, jobs. When an employee is not paid, she has less money to spend
on goods and services, and this, in turn, harms the economy-less
money circulates into local businesses, these businesses hire fewer
workers, and all affected parties pay fewer taxes. 164 Due to the
magnitude of the wage theft phenomenon, the effects on the economy
are by no means negligible.' 65
158. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An
EmpiricalIntervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197,1232 (2005).
159. Id. at 1232-33.
160. See Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 885 (1996).
161. See Korobkin, supra note 128, at 6; Warren & Westbrook, supra note 158, at 1232.
162.

See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 44, at 50; HOUS. INTERFAITH WORKER JUSTICE CTR.,

supra note 44, at 6.
163. See supratext accompanying notes 69-71.
164. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 44, at 50; CHO ET AL., supra note 13, at 5.

165. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 44, at 50.
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Because of the cumulative strength of these arguments, it is my
view that employees should be able to collect their wage claims more
easily than other creditors. However, more important than my personal
opinion about this question is the understanding that there are good
claims both in favor and against giving preference to employment
claims. The treatment of employment claims is related to more profound
questions of economic viewpoint and social justice, and it is not within
the scope of this paper, nor is it my goal, to make the case in favor of
such preference or against it. My claim is, therefore, more limited. I
argue that, to the extent a certain jurisdiction (a country or state) decides
that employees' claims deserve preferential treatment, the preference
should be implemented through a wage assurance fund and not through a
bankruptcy priority. My claim pertains to the model used for preferring
employment claims, and not to the question of whether or not such
preference should be given in the first place. As this Article has shown,
do decide to give employment
though, the vast majority of jurisdictions
166
claims some kind of protection.
B.

The Advantages of an Insurance-BasedModel

When examining the preference of pre-bankruptcy employment
claims, it is important to note that such a preference does not come
without a cost. It comes at an expense to other parties, which finance the
payment to the employees--even if not knowingly. The model selected
for the preference determines the identity of the party or parties to bear
the cost.
A model that grants employees a priority in the debtor's assets, like
a bankruptcy priority or a wage lien, places the cost of the payment on
lower priority (unsecured) creditors. Since the employees receive the
payment from the debtor before the lower priority creditors do, the value
that the unsecured creditors will be able to receive decreases. The
are left with less
employees are paid in full, and the unsecured creditors
1 67
of the debtor's assets fiom which they can recover.
An insurance-based model, on the other hand, places the cost of the
employees' payment on those who pay the premiums to the wage
assurance fund. 168 If the fund is financed through an obligatory fee
imposed on all employees and employers (as I suggest), it would be the
general public who bears the burden of the preference. The higher the

166. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
167. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)(2012).
168.

See NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 68, at 120.
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payments to unpaid employees in the event of insolvency, the higher the
fees (the premiums) the public will have to pay the fund.
The question of which model of preference is best can, therefore, be
phrased as a question of who is the most efficient risk bearer. Who
should bear the risk of an employer's inability to pay its employees-the
employer's unsecured creditors or the public of employers and
employees?' 69 I argue that the answer is the latter, provided that the
public (through the wage assurance fund) has a subrogation right
towards the employer.
I base my argument on three different reasons, but before outlining
these reasons, it is important to specify an underlying assumption. When
arguing for the supremacy of the insurance based model, I assume that,
due to the reasons detailed above (or other reasons), the public believes
that employees' claims are entitled to some kind of preference over other
creditors' claims. If this assumption is wrong, then I agree there is no
justification for an insurance-based model to protect employees.
However, if indeed this assumption is wrong, then there is also no
justification for a bankruptcy priority (like the ones granted in
§ 507(a)(4)-(5)). 170 Employees seeking wages should be treated the
same way as all other creditors, and all types of preferences, whatever
model they are structured in, should be eliminated. If, on the other hand,
my assumption is correct, then I argue an insurance-based model is a
better way to give employees the preference the public believes they
deserve. As opposed to the current legal situation, and much of the
scholarship, I believe a bankruptcy priority is inefficient and does not
adequately express the public's choices.171
The first reason to prefer a payment from a wage assurance fund is
that a bankruptcy priority claim does not ensure the workers will
actually receive the payments to which they are entitled. While the
priority allows the employees to receive their claims before the
unsecured creditors, it does not, in any way, guarantee that the employer
has sufficient assets from which the employees can recover. Similar to
the example given in the Introduction, an employer may have very few
assets, or its assets may already have liens attached, and in such cases,
the employees' priority will have no effect. 172 The employees will not
169. See Jackson, supra note 103, at 1399-401; Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield,
Impossibility and Related Doctrinesin ContractLaw: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83,
90 (1977); Seror, supra note 88, at 153.
170. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)-(5)(2012).
171. See supra notes 113-48 and accompanying text.
172. Supra text accompanying notes 1-6; see also Skeel, supra note 127, at 1478 (discussing
the Enron bankruptcy and the billions of dollars lost by Enron employees); Jason Schwartz, End
Game, BOS. MAG. (Aug. 2012), http://www.bostonmagazine.com/2012/07/38-studios-end-game
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receive even their prioritized claims because the debtor has no assets to
give. Payment from a wage assurance fund, on the other hand, ensures
the employees' recovery. The fund is not related to a debtor's assets and,
assuming it is managed properly, should have sufficient assets to pay all
wage claims. Thus, if the public indeed believes employees should be
paid for work they rendered, then a wage assurance fund is a better way
to achieve this goal.
A second reason for preferring the insurance-based model concerns
the manner in which the cost of such preference is distributed. As
explained earlier, granting employees a priority claim in a debtor's73
assets places the cost of the precedence upon the unsecured creditors.'
A debtor's assets are first used to satisfy the employees, and the
unsecured creditors are left to collect smaller portions of their own
claims. The group of unsecured creditors, however, is often relatively
small, comprised of a random assortment of creditors. Some of the
creditors may be financially strong, but others are likely to be socioeconomically weak-some of them, like tort victims, may even be nonadjusting creditors. Placing the burden of the employees' preference on
those creditors is not socially justified. Even if we acknowledge that the
employees are entitled to a preference, it is wrong to place the cost of
such preferential treatment on the shoulders of other creditors who may
be just as weak (suppliers, customers, private debenture holders, or
others).' Paying the employees' pre-bankruptcy claims through a wage
assurance fund, on the other hand, spreads the cost of the preferential
treatment widely. In this model, the cost is placed on all those who pay
the premiums to the wage assurance fund (all employers and
employees), so the amount each of them pays is relatively small. This
decreases the damage created by an employer's insolvency, especially
the damage to its weaker creditors. In addition, just like income taxes,
the fees paid to the fund can be collected progressively. 175 Higher
income earners can pay higher fees than those with lower incomes, so
that the cost of the preferential treatment is spread more justly.
Moreover, even if we assume that all of an employer's creditors are
strong-adjusting creditors, placing the burden of the employees'
preferential treatment on the creditors creates social and economic costs.
(discussing the bankruptcy of ex-professional baseball player Curt Schilling's video-game company,
38 Studios, and the company's failure to pay employee wages and benefits).
173.

See supra text accompanying note 168.

174. See Keating, supra note 133, at 925-26 ("What legislators often forget is that the creation
of a priority for one class necessarily implicates the return that will be available for other, equally
sympathy-evoking claimants.").
175. Beverly Moran, Wealth Redistribution and the Income Tax, 53 How. L.J. 319, 322-26
(2010).
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Preferring employees' claims in bankruptcy reduces the recovery rate of
the unsecured creditors and, thus, increases the risk of extending loans.
Adjusting creditors, strong financially or otherwise, price this risk, and
they will probably raise the interest rates to compensate themselves for
the extra risk involved. This means that, all other things being equal,
giving employees a preference over adjusting creditors results in higher
credit prices in the economy. High credit rates slow down the economy
because they reduce the commercial incentive to invest money in
productive projects (even profitable ones).176 As a result, fewer
businesses manage to develop and grow, and more businesses are likely
to get into financial trouble. 77 Furthermore, the financial creditors,
knowing debtors' financial status, would probably distinguish among
debtors. The creditors are likely to raise interest rates for businesses with
a high risk of insolvency and are less likely to do so for stable businesses
whose chances of entering financial distress are slim. Interest rates will
thus rise specifically for the businesses that most depend on additional
credit-small and medium-sized businesses, businesses in trouble, startups, and the sort.178 Increasing interest rates in this way is
certainly inefficient and could cost the economy dearly. It functions
like regressive tax on credit, slowing down business growth and
reducing investments.
Nevertheless, even if placing the burden of employees' preferential
treatment on the creditors creates costs for the economy, why should we
instead place this burden on the general public? Imposing a mandatory
insurance on the public is also costly, and as opposed to debtors'
creditors, the public is not involved with a debtor and need not pay for
its financial mistakes. 79 Why then is it right to force an insurance-based
model on the public?
176. Steve Parrish, What Happens if Interest Rates Go Up?, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2013, 12:07
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveparrish/2013/08/20/what-happens-if-interest-rates-go-up.
177. Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J.
1807, 1812-14 (1998). See generally Thomas J. Healey & Sandesh Dhungana, A World with Higher
Interest Rates (Mossaver-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov't, M-RCBG Associate Working Paper
Series No. 22, Sept. 2013), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/publications/awp/awp22.
178. William H. Meckling, FinancialMarkets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State,
41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 13, 23-24.
179. The fact that the public, as opposed to the creditors, has no direct relationship with the
debtor may also affect the monitoring of its financial behavior. Whereas creditors monitor debtors'
financial behavior, a dispersed public has no monitoring capabilities. See George G. Triantis &
Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 1073,
1076-78 (1995). We deal with the monitoring issue more elaborately further on, see infra notes 23338 and accompanying text, but at this point it is important to note that although the dispersed public
cannot monitor a debtor, a wage assurance fund can. The fund bears the cost of the employees'
preference (it pays the unpaid employees), and it has an interest to monitor employers and to make
sure that they generally pay employees on time.
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Here we come to the third reason for supporting the wage assurance
fund model, as we harken back to the rationales of the preference to
employees as creditors. 80 As detailed above, the reasons for granting
preference to employees are essentially social.' Workers, perhaps more
than other creditors, are dependent on their salary for their basic needs;
they cannot diversify their investment in their employer, and they are
maladjusting creditors.8 2 Therefore, as a society we wish to help
workers in their time of need. As Congressmen Conyers put it: "[W]e
must do more to ensure that [our] most important resource-workers
and retirees-are treated more fairly when.., businesses seek to
reorganize their financial affairs . . . .""' But inasmuch as the reasoning
is social, it is also society that needs to pay for this fair treatment. If the
public believes employment claims should be paid even in case of an
employer's insolvency, it should finance this belief through fees to the
wage assurance fund. This way, both the costs and benefits of the
employees' preference are borne by the public, and employment claims
are more efficiently protected. Placing the costs of the employees'
preferential treatment on the creditors, on the other hand, creates
externalities. 84 In the United States, the public (through the legislature)
but the costs of this choice are borne by the
chooses the level of priority,
85
unsecured creditors.
The creditors, to be sure, or at least the adjusting creditors, do not
absorb the cost of the employees' preferential treatment. 186 As noted
earlier, the wage priority decreases the rate of return on their loans, and
they account for this decrease in return by increasing the interest rates
they charge. 87 In theory, this pricing mechanism can also bring an
optimal level of preference. The legislature should weigh the economic
costs that result from the delta in interest rates1 88 against the social
benefits that result from protecting unpaid employees,' 8 9 and then set the
180. See supraPart HI.A.
181. See supraPart HI.A.
182. See Lassiter, supra note 132, at 954-55.
183. 159 CONG. REc. E5 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2013) (emphasis added) (statement ofRep. Conyers).
184. See supraPart I.
185. Economic literature teaches us that externalities cause inefficiency in the allocation of
resources. See Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & EcON. 141, 143-50 (1979).
186. See Meckling, supranote 178, at 23-24.
187. See supra notes 175-86.
188. The delta in the interest rates means the difference, other things being equal, between the
interest rate charged on a loan extended in a world with a bankruptcy wage priority and the interest
charged on the same loan in a world with no bankruptcy wage priority.
189. The social benefits are derived from the security each employee has that she will be paid
for work she rendered, even in case of her employer's bankruptcy, and perhaps for some people,
also from living in a more egalitarian society, which pays unprotected employees their wages.
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priority at a level in which the priority's marginal cost equals its
marginal benefit. In practice, however, doing so is almost impossible.
Credit prices are influenced by a myriad of factors, and it is difficult to
isolate the effect of a higher bankruptcy wage priority on the interest
rates and on the economy's performance as a whole. The effect depends,
among other factors, on the condition of each individual debtor (its risk
of insolvency, its number of employees, the salaries it pays, and other
considerations), and it is difficult to verify to what extent economic
changes were the result of a change in the bankruptcy wage priority or of
the other factors. 9 Without measuring the priority's costs, however, the
decision regarding the amount and scope of the prioritized claims is
distorted. The legislature is liable to set the level of protection too high
or too low, because it is unaware of (or worse, it disregards) the price the
economy pays for this choice. Decisions concerning the level of priority
are often guided by political interests and populist beliefs, rather than by
a systematic analysis of the costs and benefits.'I9
The legislative history of § 507(a)(4)-(5) demonstrates exactly that
reliance on politics and popular opinion. As we have seen, Congress has
continuously raised the amount and the scope of the prioritized wage
claims in bankruptcy.'9 2 This trend, however, was not based on an indepth analysis of the employees' needs vis-i-vis the costs associated

190. It is very hard to estimate what the interest rates would be in a world with no bankruptcy
wage priority, because no such world actually exists. To optimally measure the priority's effects we
would need two jurisdictions with similar economic conditions, one with such a priority and one
without, and then we would need to look at the difference in interest rates between these two
jurisdictions. Since two jurisdictions with similar economic conditions cannot be found, the
measurements of the priority's effect will be inaccurate. Economists can try to bypass this difficulty,
for example, by measuring the effects of the changes in the scope of the bankruptcy priority in a
single jurisdiction over time (when the scope of the bankruptcy priority changes). Since other
economic conditions also change at the same time, it will be difficult to isolate the changes caused
specifically due to the changes in the priority's scope.
191. Cf Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth
Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1355
(1993). The fact that the public is sometimes unaware of costs created by legislation, and that
political officials use the public's lack of knowledge to their advantage, was demonstrated by
Edward Zelinsky with regard to unfunded mandates imposed on municipalities by state
governments. Id. at 1369. Zelinsky explains that since state legislators receive political benefits
from the mandates but do not bear the costs, which are borne by the local governments, they have
an interest to increase the scope of the mandates. Id. at 1374-75. A similar process occurs in the
context of the wage priority. The legislators, in this case the federal legislators, receive political
benefits from increasing the scope of the bankruptcy wage priority (for example, from labor unions
or consumer organizations), but they do not necessarily bear the priority's costs. The priority's costs
are embedded in interest rates, but the public does connect the wage priority and the interest rates it
pays. Therefore, politicians have a political interest to increase the scope of the priority beyond its
efficient level.
192. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
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with the wage priority, but rather it was fairly arbitrary and very much
influenced by pressures from interest groups, especially the unions.'9 3
The unions supported the attempts to increase the amount of the
claims,' 94 and their representatives appeared in congressional hearings
arguing in favor of additional reforms. 95 Congress, it seems, did not pay
193. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA")
raised the bankruptcy priority from $4000 to $10,000. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2012); BAPCPA, sec.
1401, § 507(a), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, 214. However, there were various other proposals
to increase the amount of the allowed wage claims. The proposal for the $10,000 increase was first
introduced in March 2003. 149 CoNG. REc. 6560 (Mar. 19, 2003) (statement of Rep. Cannon).
There was a proposal to raise the amount to $13,500 in 2002. 148 CONG. REC. 15,369 (July 30,
2002) (statement of Sen. Camahan). In 2005, another proposal was made, this time for $15,000. 151
CONG. REC. 1853 (Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller). In 2013, there was a proposal to
increase the limit to $20,000. 159 CONG. REC. E5 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2013) (statement of Rep.
Conyers). None of these proposals (including the one accepted) justifies the maximum amount of
the claims proposed, and none of the proponents discuss the costs of raising the limit of bankruptcy
wage priority. It is unclear from the congressional documents why the wage priority was set at
$10,000, or why other amounts are any better. 151 CONG. REC. 3180 (Mar. 2, 2005) (statement of
Sen. Rockefeller). Populist explanations for the need to increase the wage claims priority, on the
other hand, are abundant. In a congressional hearing conducted in 2007, for example, Fred
Redmond, a representative of the United Steelworkers, explained to Congress why an additional
reform is warranted:
[R]eform should assign higher priority to the payment of employee and retiree
obligations, allowing them to be paid before other creditors who are more able to absorb
losses than is a worker and a worker's family. These other creditors with deeper financial
resources include highly compensated lawyers and investment bankers.
American Workers in Crisis: Does the Chapter 11 Business Bankruptcy Law Treat Employees and
Retirees Fairly?: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Congress 21 (2007) (testimony of Fred Redmond, International Vice President,
Human Affairs, United Steelworkers (USW)). Redmond does not clarify the relevance of lawyers or
investment bankers to the wage priority amount and neglects the fact that other creditors price the
wage priority given to employees. Id.
194. When discussing the amendments to the BAPCPA in the Senate bill, for example, Senator
Richard Durbin explicitly mentioned the interest groups that support his proposed amendment to
increase the bankruptcy wage priority. Among the interest groups he listed were labor and consumer
unions. 151 CONG. REC. 3413-14 (Mar. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin). Strangely enough,
Senator Durbin included letters of support from some of these interest groups in the Congressional
Record. Id. Thus, the Congressional Record explicitly states that the national consumer
organizations "applaud" Senator Durbin "for offering [the] amendments to the Senate bankruptcy
bill... that would better protect employees.., in the event of a corporate bankruptcy." Id. The
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"), one of the
largest federations of labor unions in the United States, wrote in its letter that it strongly supports
Senator Rockefeller's amendment to raise the current wage priority cap. Id. The same process
occurred with regard to the PERBBA. Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies
Act of 2013, H.R. 100, 113th Cong. (2013). In the introduction to the PERBBA, Senator Conyers
clearly stated that PERBBA is supported by the AFL-CIO and the United Steelworkers. 159 CONG.
REC. E5 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2013) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
195. See, e.g., Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2007:
Hearingon H.R. 3652 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 22 (2008) (statement of Babette Ceccotti, AFL-CIO). Also testifying were
representatives of the Air Line Pilots Association, International and the Pension Rights Center. Id. at
105, 121.
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much attention to the economic costs of the wage priority, except for
some vague, and somewhat unclear, comment in a hearing that it may
cause more liquidations.' 96
The advantage of an insurance-based model, in this respect, is that
it facilitates transparency. Here, the costs of employees' preferential
treatment are clear,' 97 and they are borne directly by the premium paying
public (all employees and employers). The premiums are deducted from
the public's income, and so, it is relatively simple for people to form an
opinion as to whether or not the social benefits of the wage assurance
justify the amount of the premium they pay. If the majority of the public
believes the premiums are too high, the legislature can decrease the
limits of the insured wage or even eliminate the insurance entirely. If the
majority of the public believes a better wage assurance is required (for
example, the public may think that wage assurance should not be limited
by any dollar amount, or it should include severance pay or healthcare
payments), then the public should be willing to pay higher premiums.
Although, no doubt the legislature will still be subject to interest group
pressures, in particular from the unions. At least under the insurancebased model, the consequences of its decisions are visible. The amount
and the scope of the allowed claims from the fund are strongly linked
with the premium payments imposed on the public, and there are better
chances that the legislature's decision would reflect the public's choices
as to the socially optimal level of employee protection.
I do not know whether this proposal to adopt an insurance-based
model, if accepted, will increase or decrease the wage protection
currently provided by the Bankruptcy Code. But whatever the effect may
be, I believe that social welfare will increase. Employees will be able to
enjoy the preference independent of the size of their employers'
bankruptcy estate, the cost of the preferential treatment will be
distributed more evenly, and, most importantly, the determined level of
the preference will better reflect the public's needs and wishes. In other
words, the insurance-based model serves the same purposes as the
bankruptcy priority, but it does so more efficiently. It is more just in
terms of the distribution of cost, and it is more accurate in terms of the
level of protection chosen.

196. See id. at 117 (statement of Michael L. Bernstein, Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP).
197. The fund's costs are the amount of wage claims the fund pays to the unpaid employees
plus the administrative costs of running the fund. As opposed to the costs associated with a
bankruptcy priority, these amounts are easily verifiable and can be published to the public.
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C. The Importanceof the Fund'sSubrogation Right
So far, I have justified the insurance-based model, but the model
will not be complete without allowing the fund to claim from the debtor
what it has paid out to the employees-the right of subrogation.
The right of subrogation is a prevalent right in insurance
contracts.198 In an insurance context, when an insurer indemnifies an
insured person for damages suffered from a tortfeasor, the right of
subrogation entitles the insurer to take legal actions against the tortfeasor
in the place of the insured. 199 The insured subrogates his claim against
the tortfeasor to the insurer, and the insurer stands in her shoes as against
the tortfeasor to recover what it already paid to the insured. 200 The same
principle, mutatis mutandis, should be applied in a wage insurance
context. 20 1 Here, since the wage assurance fund pays the employees, the
employees should subrogate their rights against the employers (debtors)
to the fund. Thus, to the extent the wages, in whole or in part, can be
collected from employers' estates, then the fund will be able to recover
from the employers what it paid the employees.20 2
I believe giving subrogation rights to the fund is necessary because
it prevents unjust enrichment for any of the different parties involved.
First, after getting paid by the fund, clearly the employees should not be
allowed to sue the employer themselves. Once the employees receive the
wages to which they were entitled, allowing them to take action against
employers would result in their receiving double compensation. 20 3 The
fund, on the other hand, should be allowed to take action against the
debtors, because otherwise the debtors, or more precisely their creditors,
will be unjustly enriched at the public's expense. When the fund pays
the wage claims to employees, the money comes from the premium
paying public instead of from debtors' estates. This means that each of
the debtors' creditors receives a larger portion of the debtor's estate than
it would have otherwise received had the employees been taken as
regular unsecured creditors. This result is wholly unjustified. Society's
choice to strengthen the group of employees should not enrich the other
creditors.20 4 The creditors should receive the same portion of the

198. Mark C. Weber, Taking Subrogation Seriously: The Blue Cross-Blue Shield Tobacco
Litigation Reconsidered,67 BROOK. L. REv. 381, 385-86 (2001).

199. See id
200.

201.
202.
203.
204.
creditors

Id.

Johnson, supra note 138, at 229-31.
Secunda, supra note 25, at 918-19.
Id. at 918.
Making the public pay the employment claims unjustly enriches the creditors because the
are compensated for the risk of the debtor's insolvency, while the public actually bears the
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debtor's estate they would have received if the employees' claims had
not been paid by the fund, while the public should have the right to reclaim the amounts it paid in lieu of the employer. This result is achieved
when the fund receives the subrogation right.
The fund's subrogation claim against the debtor, though, should be
classified as a simple unsecured claim (rather than a preferred claim,
which is the case when the employee files the claim).,z 5 A higher
classification would lead to the fund receiving payment before the other
unsecured creditors, which would decrease these creditors' rates of
recovery. This is exactly the result we intended to avoid. It places the
cost of the employees' preference on the creditors and increases interest
rates. Classifying the subrogation right as a regular unsecured claim, on
the other hand, properly distributes the risk of insolvency. The
employees are paid in full by the fund (up to the limit afforded by the
legislator);20 6 the fund has an unsecured claim against the debtor for the
amount it paid;20 7 and the difference between what the fund pays and
what it receives (as an unsecured creditor) is paid by the premium
paying public. This difference represents the preference the employees
receive when compared to other unsecured creditors, and since this
preference is a social choice, the public should pay for it.2°8
This solution also reduces distorted incentives for various parties.
On the one hand, contrary to a bankruptcy priority model, here creditors
and debtors are not harmed. Just like outside bankruptcy, the wage
claims (now claimed by the fund as a subrogation claim) are considered
unsecured, and so, the creditors' rate of return is not decreased. On the
other hand, as opposed to a situation where the fund has no subrogation
cost of the unpaid wages. The loans' interest rates are calculated under the assumption that
employment claims will be paid out of the bankruptcy estate, but the public, rather than bankruptcy
estate, pays these claims. Moreover, a problem still exists even if interest rates are adjusted to reflect
the creation of a wage assurance fund (to reflect the fact that once a debtor files for bankruptcy, the
fund pays the claims to the employees with no subrogation right). The problem is that such a rule
perversely incentivizes the debtor to file for bankruptcy, even if the bankruptcy is unwarranted, in
order to enjoy the public funds. Whereas outside bankruptcy the employer has to pay the
employees' wages itself, inside bankruptcy the public pays the wages. From a debtor's perspective,
if the fund that pays the employees cannot reclaim what it paid from the employer, why not file for
bankruptcy and let the public pay the labor costs? In this case, the debtor, and thereby indirectly its
creditors, are unjustly enriched.
205. As opposed to the view we present here, in most places the wage assurance fund receives
the employees' bankruptcy priority and is not classified as unsecured. See Secunda, supra note 25,
at 919. However, this is not the case in Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland, where the fund sues the
employer as an unsecured creditor. Id.
206. We assume payment to the employees in full is justified, because of the reasons detailed
in Part IlI.B above.
207. The creditors pay the fund what the employees' would have received without any priority.
208. See supraPart M.B.
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right, debtors and creditors do not profit from the proposed solution. The
subrogation right allows the fund to claim the debt from a debtor, so that
the payment made to its employees does not decrease the
debtor's balance of debts. This reduces debtors' and creditors' perverse
incentives to forum shop and allows for more effective use of
insolvency proceedings.2 0 9
IV.

A GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INSURANCE-BASED MODEL

The Article has, so far, discussed the use of an insurance-based
solution only in case of bankruptcy. By definition, § 507(a)(4)-(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code applies only to wage claims filed in a bankruptcy
proceeding.2 10 It was easier, and perhaps more intuitive, to first frame
the insurance-based model in the context of bankruptcy.
Many cases of unpaid wages, however, do not involve formal
bankruptcy proceedings. 211 The employee receives a judgment in her
favor, and, although the employer does not file for bankruptcy, the
company tries to avoid payment of the judgment. The employer
disappears, hides assets, or reorganizes as a new entity, and the
employee finds herself without pay.2 12 In these cases, the collection of
the judgment can be even more difficult than the collection inside
bankruptcy. To collect their pay, the employees have to trace the
employer, track down available assets, and, perhaps, try to pierce the
corporate veil to find additional sources from which to recover. This
process requires time and money, and for unpaid employees, who often
come from poor socio-economic backgrounds, it may be impossible to
spend the resources required to collect what they deserve. As a result,
they often give up the collection efforts altogether, and thus, the
employer benefits from the wage theft and the employees are robbed of
their compensation.2" 3
214
In light of the alarming proportions of the wage theft epidemic, I
believe that it makes little sense to give a priority to employees only in
the case of bankruptcy. I argue that if a proper legal authority
determined, through a judgment, that a debt to an employee exists, and if
the employee cannot independently collect the judgment from the

209. For a more elaborate analysis of the forum shopping problem, see infra Part W.A.
210. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)-(5) (2012).
211. See NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supranote 68, at I 11.
212. Id.
213.

See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 44, at 4-6.

214. See supratext accompanying notes 42-47.
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employer, then it is the obligation of the wage assurance fund to pay the
employee, whether her employer filed for bankruptcy or not.2" 5
A.

In Support of an Insurance-BasedSolution Outside of Bankruptcy

The first argument for the implementation of an insurance-based
model for outside bankruptcy, as well, is that giving employees
preferential treatment only inside bankruptcy is unjust. This practice
discriminates against employees whose employer did not file for
bankruptcy, because the act of filing for bankruptcy has little relevance
to the protection that the employment claims deserve.
Filing for bankruptcy is a legal procedure.216 It takes place when a
debtor files a formal petition with the bankruptcy court, and it is not
necessarily linked to the debtor's default. A debtor may be insolvent and
still decide not to file for bankruptcy, or an employer may be solvent and
still try to avoid paying the employees the compensation that it owes
them.217 The forum (bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy) in which the debtor
(employer) resolves its economic problems is usually decided by the
employer, and the employees have little or no influence on their
employer's decision as to the filing.2" 8 The employees, therefore, should
not be punished for their employer's legal choice, and they should
receive a level of compensation equal to their peers whose employer did
file.219 If a social justification exists for preferring employees inside
215. I do not argue that all jurisdictions should adopt an insurance-based model that applies
both within and outside of bankruptcy. It may very well be that some jurisdictions do not believe
that employees should receive a preferential treatment at all, and those jurisdictions, according to
my view, should use neither a wage assurance fund nor a bankruptcy priority. What I do argue is
that it is wrong to give employees preferential treatment only in bankruptcy. If a jurisdiction
believes that employees' claims should be protected, then such protection should be given both
within and outside of a bankruptcy process. See supraPart II.A.
216. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil
Procedure,61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931,937-38 (2004); see JACKSON, supra note 148, at 16-17.
217. A Chapter 11 Debtor Need Not Be Broke, COM. BANKR. ALTS. (Feb. 3, 2014),
http://commercialbankruptcyaltematives.com/articles/a-chapter- 11 -debtor-need-not-be-broke.
218. In theory, involuntary bankruptcy proceedings are an option for the employees. 11 U.S.C.
§ 303 (2012). Assuming the employment claims are of sufficient value, the employees could force
their employer into bankruptcy, even against its will. Id. In practice, however, this rarely happens.
First, the employees usually do not have sufficient information about their employer's financial
situation. Even if the employer does not pay employees their wages when due, they often do not
realize that insolvency is looming, and they prefer keeping their job rather than dragging their
employer into court. After the employer collapses, often an involuntary bankruptcy will not help the
employees. The employer has no assets, or it disappears and cannot be located. Second, employees
do not have the legal knowledge, the time, or the money to initiate involuntary bankruptcy
proceedings. Initiating bankruptcy proceedings can be very expensive, and often the unpaid
employees are from low socio-economic backgrounds, with little awareness of the methods by
which they may enforce their legal rights.
219. This is especially true since the majority of failing businesses do not enter bankruptcy.
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bankruptcy (and current law implies that it does), then the same
justification also should apply when the employer decides not to file.220
Take, for example, two employees-one working for a high-tech firm,
and the other for a cleaning services company. Both employees are not
paid for two months, but the high-tech firm files for bankruptcy and
reorganizes, while the cleaning services company simply vanishes and
moves to another state. Is there any reason why the high-tech employee
should receive her full wage claims (up to the legal limit of the
bankruptcy priority), while the cleaning services employee will be left
empty-handed? 221 Why should their employers' choices affect their right
to receive a preference? I think it would be more just for both employees
to be entitled to payment, even if capped by a certain dollar amount,
rather than one employee receiving a priority while the other, often the
weaker employee, gets nothing for her past claims.
Second, applying preferential treatment only in bankruptcy is
inefficient. There is an extensive body of literature, especially law and
economics literature, which shows that bankruptcy-specific changes to
substantive laws are harmful. 22 When the two forums, bankruptcy and
non-bankruptcy, implement a different set of substantive rules, the
debtor and its creditors may seek the forum that maximizes their claims
as individuals rather than the forum that maximizes the debtor's
estate. 223 This phenomenon, known as forum shopping, also occurs when
Edward R. Morrison, BargainingAround Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts and State Law, 38
J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 260 (2009).
220. See JACKSON, supranote 148, at 112-13.

221. See Baird, supra note 133, at 817-18. Douglas Baird also questions the justification for
preferring employees only in a bankruptcy setting. In reply to Elizabeth Warren, who advocates the
bankruptcy priority he explains:
Warren argues, for example, that bankruptcy law should favor those who are least able to
bear the costs of a business failure. For this reason, she argues, employees rightly enjoy
their limited priority under existing bankruptcy law. Warren, however, needs to explain
why those who are least able to bear these costs should nevertheless bear them when the
firm closes or fails outside of bankruptcy.
Id. at 817.
222. See JACKSON, supra note 148, at 20-27; Baird, supra note 133, 824-28. Specifically with
regard to employees, see Omer Kimhi & Arno Doebert, Bankruptcy Law as a Balancing System:
Lessons from a ComparativeAnalysis of the Intersection Between Labor and Bankruptcy Laws, 23
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 491, 512-19 (2015).

223. See Baird, supra note 133, at 817-27. Baird explains this problem through the following
example: Imagine there are two cities, each with its own courthouse. The reason for building the
two courts is to allow the residents of each city to resolve their disputes close to where they reside
without having to spend unnecessary travelling costs. If, however, the two courthouses adjudicate
cases according to a different set of substantive rules, then the purpose of having two courthouses
will be defeated. Litigants will choose the court that applies the rules that maximize their chances of
success, even when adjudication in that courthouse imposes unnecessary travelling costs on all
parties. The same is true with regard to bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy forums. The goal of
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employees are given preferential treatment inside but not outside of
bankruptcy.224 In this case, employees may prefer a bankruptcy forum
(especially when they can easily find an alternative job) to render their
pre-petition claims preferred, while other creditors may disfavor
bankruptcy, even when economically justified, to avoid the employees'
preference. Due to these perverse incentives, an inefficient legal forum
may be chosen, and the debtor's value is decreased to the detriment of
the creditor group and of the public as whole.225
This inefficiency can be prevented via an insurance-based model
that applies both within and outside of bankruptcy. If the fund pays the
unpaid employees regardless of whether their employer files for
bankruptcy or not, perverse incentives are not created. Both within and
outside of bankruptcy the employees get paid by the fund and
employment claims are considered unsecured. The bankruptcy filing
changes nothing for the status of employment claims, and no party
should have an incentive to support or object to a filing merely due to
the employees' preference. As the Supreme Court explained, a uniform
treatment of substantive rights within and outside bankruptcy serves to
"reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to
prevent a party from receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the
happenstanceof bankruptcy.9'226
Yet a third reason to implement the insurance-based model, both
within and outside of bankruptcy, concerns the monitoring of nonpaying employers. Employers who refuse to pay their employees' wages
are sometimes repeat offenders. The wage theft violations are usually the
result of a deliberate decision by employers, and are connected to a
broader business strategy in the workplace rather than to an isolated
event. 227 As part of this culture, employers also attempt to frustrate the
collection of judgments given in favor of their employees. They vanish,
hide assets, or shut down operations entirely, only to reorganize as a new
legal entity while harming additional employees and creditors. 28
creating a bankruptcy specific collection system is to maximize the debtor's value when it becomes
insolvent. If, however, substantive laws change as a result of the bankruptcy filing, then the debtor
and creditors will choose the forum that implements the law most favorable to their individual
claims. They may invoke bankruptcy in order to gain advantages from the substantive law
modifications, even when the bankruptcy reduces the debtor's value for all other claimants. This
creates economic inefficiency, and in a sense reintroduces the very problem bankruptcy is designed
to solve. See id.
224. See supranote 223 and accompanying text.
225. See Kimhi & Doebert, supranote 222, at 514.
226. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (emphasis added) (citing Lewis v. Mfrs.
Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
227. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supranote 44, at 4-5.
228. See NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 68, at 111.
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Leaving the monitoring task in the hands of the unpaid employees is
encouraging these violating employers. Since employees do not have the
resources required for chasing the non-paying employers, they are often
unable to initiate effective collection proceedings.229 The debt to each
individual employee is not usually large enough to justify a long and
expensive legal chase after her employer's assets;230 and so, solvent
employers are able to get away without paying their employees what
they legally deserve. This pushes the wage theft phenomenon even
further, to the detriment of the public as a whole.2 3'
A wage assurance fund can help improve the collection efforts. As
explained, the fund should have a right to collect from the employer the
amounts it pays the employees (a subrogation right).232 Since the fund
can aggregate all unpaid employment claims, the amounts it would need
to collect from employers are much higher than the amounts each
individual employee is owed. The higher amounts render an investment
in collection efforts worthwhile. It is beneficial to invest resources in
locating assets or piercing corporate veils when the prospective rewards
from such actions are significant. In addition, since the fund would be a
repeat player, it could gain knowledge and expertise in this type of
proceeding. Collection efforts may be conducted in a faster and
smoother manner, and avoiding payment will become harder for the
employers. Indeed, anecdotal evidence gathered by Dr. Janis Sarra
shows that the creation of a wage assurance fund improves collection
efforts.233 Dr. Sarra conducted a comparative analysis regarding the
treatment of employment claims, and she notes that a number of
jurisdictions reported the establishment of a fund addressed the
collection problems suffered by the individual employees.23 4 This will
not only help unpaid employees to get the money they deserve, but also
deter future employers from committing wage theft. If payment is more
likely to be enforced on refusing employers, employers will be less

229. See Secunda, supra note 25, at 919.
230. The collection efforts can include investigations to track down assets or to locate the
debtor, attachment of liens, litigation in order to pierce corporate veils, and additional actions
designed to force refusing employers to pay. All these actions cost money, which the employees
may not have.
231. Dixon, supranote 42 ("If we want workers to come forward, we have to show that we can
get them their unpaid wages.").
232. See supratext accompanying notes 198-209.
233. See SARRA, supra note 100, at 28.
234. Id. ("[A] number of jurisdictions reported that the fund's ability to recover on the
employees' behalf addresses the collective action problems faced by individual employees who may
not have the information, resources or bargaining power to realize on their claims individually.").
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likely to avoid payment, especially if heavy fines and penalties are
imposed on those that do.235
B.

The Cost of an OverarchingInsurance-BasedModel

These arguments, I believe, justify the implementation of an
insurance-based model both within and outside of bankruptcy. Such
implementation is more just to the employees, decreases forum
shopping, and allows for better monitoring of non-paying employers.
The problem in expanding the wage assurance payments to nonbankruptcy situations, however, seems to be the cost. If the fund has to
pay all unpaid wage claims to employees--either within or outside of
bankruptcy, then the cost of the insurance-based model might be too
heavy. Due to the extended obligations towards employees, the fund's
costs may increase, and consequently, so will the premiums the public
needs to pay. This, it may be argued, can be problematic, because there
is no point in forcing the public to purchase insurance on which it needs
to pay very high premiums.
This perception of the costs of an insurance-based model is wrong,
in my opinion, on two counts: conceptually and practically. From a
conceptual perspective, the cost of an insurance-based model is a
function of the scope of the insurance coverage. The smaller the
coverage, the fewer payments the fund needs to pay to the employees
and the lesser the premiums the public needs to pay to the fund. This
means that if the legislature wants to decrease the premium level, it can
reduce the scope of the insurance coverage, without restricting its
application only to a bankruptcy process. The legislature can limit the
amount of the allowed claims, the type of the allowed claims, or the
timing in which the allowed claims can arise.236 To be sure, applying the
insurance-based model only in bankruptcy also decreases the
premiums, 237 but it achieves this goal with the wrong tool. It is better to
limit the fund's costs through parameters that are connected to the
amount or the type of the allowed claims, rather than through parameters

235. It is true that in some cases (perhaps even in most cases) the employer will not have the
means to reimburse the fund because it is indeed insolvent. But in these cases, it is also socially just
that the fund will pay the unpaid employees. As I argued earlier, the employees should not bear the
cost of their employer's insolvency alone, and the cost should be widely spread among the premium
payers (employees and employers).
236.

SARRA, supra note 100, at 25.

237. In this case the fund's payments to unpaid employees are reduced because it pays only
employees whose employer filed for bankruptcy-not all employees whose employers fails to pay
them. A reduction in the fund's payments to unpaid employees results in a reduction of the premium
paid by the public.
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that pertain to the employer's legal decision to file for bankruptcy or not.
As we have explained, limiting the preference to an arbitrary
group of employees-those whose employer decided to file for
bankruptcy-while denying it to all other employees is unjust and
creates efficiency problems.238
The second, more practical, basis for our position is the fact that
even if a fund paid all unpaid wages in full with no limitations, both
within and outside of bankruptcy, the cost of such coverage would be
trivial. A broad scope of insurance coverage does not necessarily mean a
high premium because the costs of the wage assurance fund are shared
among a very large population-all employees and employers.
To demonstrate this assertion, we look to California, for which
relatively accurate data on unpaid wage claims is available.239 According
to the research by Cho, Koonse, and Mischel, between the years 2008
and 2011, the DLSE issued decisions obligating the payment of wages
and penalties totaling $282,071,969 (not including settlement awards).240
From this amount, employees were able to collect $42,436,641.241 Thus,
if a wage assurance fund existed in California, it would have had to pay
employees a total of $239,635,328. According to data from California's
Employment Development Department, the labor force in the state
consists of about 17.9 million employees. 42 This means that if all
employees in California paid premiums to cover the entire payment due
to the unpaid employees, each employee would have to pay a total of
$14 for the entire four years (2008-2011), or about thirty cents a month.
I believe thirty cents a month is a small amount to pay for the assurance
that, even when an employer falls onto hard times and defaults, the
compensation for work rendered by its employees will be paid in full.
This amount does not take into account that employers should also share
the premium burden, that the fund can recover additional funds from
shirking employers, or that the fund can collect penalties and fines
imposed on non-paying employers.
Clearly, this is not a very accurate measure. The calculation does
not take into account various factors (such as administrative costs,
litigation costs, temporal fluctuations, and others), and it obviously
changes from state to state. However, the calculation does give us a
rough estimate, and shows that an insurance-based solution, even one
238. See supra Part W.A.
239.

CHO ET AL., supranote 13, at 14.

240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Labor Market Information, CAL. EMP. DEV. DEP'T, http://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
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that is not connected to the employer's bankruptcy filing, need not be
very costly. The efficiency costs of a bankruptcy priority---costs rooted
in the increased interest rates charged-may be much higher.
V.

CONCLUSION

Congress is rightfully worried about the plight of employees.2 43 The
data on wage theft in general, and on uncollected wage claims in
particular, is troubling, and indeed, something must be done. The
problem is that this issue usually comes up to the legislature, or to the
public's attention, when a big bankruptcy occurs, like that of LTV Steel,
Enron, or the city of Detroit. 2" Then the suggested solution is to amend
the Bankruptcy Code to once again increase the wage priority, rather
than create a complete and overarching solution. But the wage collection
problem is not a bankruptcy specific problem, and as such, it does not
require a bankruptcy specific solution. If the values most Americans
hold dictate that employees' wage claims should receive preferential
treatment, then these values should hold true whether the employer filed
for bankruptcy or whether it collapsed or disappeared without filing.
The insurance-based model this Article advocates creates a link
between the values the public holds and the preferential treatment
employees receive. The model acknowledges that the employees'
preference, in whatever form it takes, has costs, and it suggests placing
these costs directly on the public, which is the stakeholder that decides
the level of such preference. Since, as opposed to the bankruptcy
priority, the costs and benefits of the wage insurance model are clear, the
legislature is better able to adjust the level of insurance coverage
according to the public's needs and wishes. This allows for a more just
and efficient solution for unpaid employees, as the level of preference is
more accurate and the preference applies both within and outside of
bankruptcy. This Article does not take a stand on whether the insurancebased model should be implemented on a state or a federal level, but it
243. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 3179 (Mar. 2, 2005) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller); Richard
M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Property Rights in Municipal Bankruptcy, 33 REv.
BANKING & FIN. L. 609, 621-23 (2014).

[O]ver the last years, as the economy came down from the highs of the 1990s, we have
seen devastating corporate bankruptcies and how they can affect workers and their
families. I have seen that in my State, and we have all seen that in our States. From the
enormous Enron bankruptcy at the end of 2001 to the bankruptcies in my State, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania, of Wheeling-Pitt, Weirton Steel, Horizon Natural Resources, and
involving also Kentucky, every bankruptcy has brought heartache for workers who had
dedicated themselves to employers, many of them for many years.
151 CONG. REc. 3179 (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
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does show that most of the OECD countries have already
adopted this type of model (though in most cases, alongside a
bankruptcy wage priority).
The idea of a wage insurance model, I believe, is neither socialist
nor capitalist. The scope of the preferred insurance may depend on the
economic viewpoint, but the wish for a transparent system, in which
employees receive the same level of preference, whether their employer
filed for bankruptcy or not, should be shared by all. An insurance-based
model is a better tool to provide for wage protection, and the bankruptcy
priority-currently the sole model widely implemented in the United
States-should be set aside.
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